THREE-SELF PATRIOTIC MOVEMENT (TSPM) TIMELINE
1872: The first independent Chinese church was established in Guangzhou.
1910: The World Missionary Conference was established in Edinburgh.
1922: The National Christian Council of China (NCC) was established.
1937-1945: The second Sino-Japanese War took place.
1948: “The Present-Day Tragedy of Christianity” by Y.T. Wu was published.
1949 (October 1): The People’s Republic of China was founded.
1949 (December): “Message from Chinese Christians to Mission Boards Abroad” was published.
1950 (May): Meetings between elite Protestants and Premier Zhou Enlai (May 2, 6, 13, 20) took place.
1950 (July): The Christian Manifesto was signed by forty prominent Christian leaders.
1950 (September 23): The Christian Manifesto was published in the People’s Daily.
1950 (October): The Christian Manifesto was backed by 140 delegates of the NCC national meeting.
1951-1953: The Denunciation Movement emerged.
1951 (April): The “Preparatory Committee for the Oppose-America, Assist-Korea Three-Self Reform Movement” was established.
1954 (July 22-August 6): First National Conference of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement took place.
1958: TSPM pushed churches to initiate “United Worship.”
1966-1976: The Cultural Revolution era occurred.
1978: A small number of Protestant churches reopened.
1980 (October 6-13): The National TSPM Committee was re-established and the China Christian Council was established.
FOUNDER/GROUP HISTORY
The Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) (三自爱国运动) is a mass “patriotic religious organization” (爱国宗教组织) in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which since its founding has sought to unite and represent all Protestant Christians in the country under the “Three-Self” principles: self-governance (自治), self-support (自养), and self-propagation (自传). Its sphere of influence covers Mainland China only: it does not operate in Hong Kong. Patriotic religious organizations were established as a response to the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) “United Front” (统一战线) strategy which aimed “to strengthen its authority and legitimacy, especially among the more marginalised, independent, and minority sectors of the Chinese population” (Groot 2015:67a-67b). The establishment and development of the TSPM should be viewed in this context, and as a response by Christians seeking the survival of Christianity in an atheist socialist state. Although the TSPM as a patriotic religious association is not an “organ of the state,” it is expected to unite its membership under the leadership of the CPC under the banner of “love [your] country, love [your] religion” (爱国, 爱教 meaning “be patriotic and be a good religious citizen”). The status of the TSPM is somewhat “ambiguous” because of its dual purpose representing religious communities and being accountable to the state for the religious activities of these communities (Dunch 2012:265; Dunch 2008:163). There is no formal membership for ordinary believers in the patriotic religious organizations. The work of the TSPM is overseen by the National Committee of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China (中国基督教三自爱国运动委员会) whose headquarters are in Shanghai.
Multiple complex factors relating to historical precedents in the Chinese state’s engagement with religion and movements within Christianity in China towards indigenization and/or independence from the nineteenth century to the 1940s, and which came together in the newly-formed PRC in 1949, in large part shaped the form and function of the TSPM in the 1950s and beyond. Despite the PRC being referred to as “New China” from 1949, the CPC government inherited many elements of imperial- and Republican-era approaches to religion. Since imperial times, the state has monitored religious groups and their activities and insisted on the registration of religious sites and leaders with the government (Bays 2012). In the early twentieth century, as reformers sought to design a modern Chinese state, they borrowed heavily from Japan, including the Christian-secular model of religion, which defined itself against the “undesirable” (irrational and backward) “superstitious” beliefs and practices that were deemed incompatible with a modern state (McLeister 2019b). With the collapse of the imperial system in 1911, the Republican government continued with this culture of administrative control of religious groups, and in keeping with a post-Enlightenment approach to religion “as a church-like institution separate from society” coerced those religions it deemed worthy of being modernized into identifiable institutions (Goossaert 2008:209-13). In large part, these religious institutions and their management by the state served as models from which the CPC liberally borrowed.
The “Three-Self” principles of the TSPM did not originate with the TSPM itself. These principles were in development long before the establishment of the PRC. Henry Venn (1796-1873) and Rufus Anderson (1796-1880) are credited with bringing together the three principles of self-support, self-governance, and self-propagation into a formula for the indigenization of Christian churches in the 1850s (Shenk 1990:29b). An early effort to put into practice elements of the three-self principles was in 1872 when Chen Mengnan (陈梦南 1840-1882) established an independent church in Guangzhou. Missionary conferences in China in 1877 (Yates 1878) and 1892 helped develop a comprehensive formulation of the three-self principles.
The first quarter of the twentieth century saw significant developments in the establishment of ecumenical movements among some mission churches and denominations, independent Christian churches and individual preachers and evangelists in China, as well as the birth of indigenous Christian movements and denominations. Although mission societies advocated “indigenization,” the slow pace caused frustration for some Chinese Christians. Pastor Cheng Jingyi’s (诚静怡1881-1939) rejection of “Western-imposed denominationalism” during the 1910 Edinburgh Missionary Conference highlighted the necessity for churches in China to be unified and Chinese-led (Tiedemann 2012:3a). Following this conference, the formation of the China Continuation Committee accelerated a more systematic approach to the three-self formula. This became the National Christian Council of China (NCC) in 1922, which initiated the ecumenical Church of Christ in China (中华基督教会), bringing together Western denominations in China and some independent Chinese churches (Tiedemann 2012:4a).
Independent Chinese churches included the Chinese Christian Independent Church (中国耶稣教自立会) established in 1906, and the Shandong Chinese Independent Christian Church (山东中华基督教自立会) established in 1915. Independent itinerant preachers included Wang Mingdao (王明道 1900-1991), Yu Cidu (余慈度Dora Yu 1873-1931), and Song Shangjie (宋尚节 John Sung 1901-1944). Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, was the emergence of indigenous Christian denominations or movements in the late 1910s through to the early 1930s. These denominations evolved with limited or no contact with foreign missions and missionaries and they embodied the three-self formula. The True Jesus Church (真耶稣教会), founded by Wei Enbo (魏恩波 Paul Wei 1877-1919), the Jesus Family (耶稣教廷), founded by Jing Dianying (敬奠瀛 1890–1957), and the Spiritual Gifts Movement (灵恩会 a network of churches heavily influenced by the revivals in northern China in the 1920s) were highly Pentecostal in nature. The Little Flock (小群会 or Local Church 聚会所), founded by Ni Tuosheng (倪柝声 “Watchman Nee” 1903-1957), was not Pentecostal but all of these denominations or movements were often critical of (Western) missions.
Several political movements in the 1910s and 1920s roused nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiments across China and Japan’s eight-year occupation of China compelled the implementation of three-self principles. The political movements included the May Fourth Movement (五四运动) in1919, the May Thirtieth Movement (五卅运动) of 1925, and the Anti-Christian Movement (非基督教运动), 1922-1927 (Yamamoto and Yamamoto 1953). The Japanese occupation of China (Second Sino-Japanese War), 1937-1945, resulted in the removal of foreign missionaries from Chinese churches and ultimately forced the realization of three-self principles in foreign mission churches: “The cutting off of Western mission funds forced the church to become self-supporting, the removal of Western missionaries forced it to become self-propagating, and the new responsibilities of leadership encouraged it to become self-governing” (Brook 1996:336). This was partly achieved through the League for the Promotion of Church Union in North China (华北基督教联合促进会) established in April 1942.
These events were instrumental in shaping the views of many Chinese Christians who would later become senior TSPM leaders, most importantly, the “progressive” Christian Y.T. Wu (吴耀宗 Wu Yaozong 1893-1979). Wu joined the YMCA in 1920, before training at Union Theological Seminary and Columbia University in New York. Wu returned to the YMCA in 1932 (Reilly 2012:264). It was attractive to young progressives because it promoted Chinese leadership. In addition, the CPC used the YMCA to perform its underground activities (Xu 2004:112). Wu’s experience is similar to the trajectory of other TSPM leaders, most of whom had association with the YMCA, St. John’s University (Shanghai) and/or Union Theological Seminary (Xu 2004:107). Wu was committed to pacifism in the 1920s, but his views shifted to the “social gospel” in the 1930s and then in the 1940s, heavily influenced by the atrocities committed under the Japanese occupation, he became procommunist or Christian socialist (Gao 1996:340-42). In April 1948, Wu published, “The Present-Day Tragedy of Christianity”, in which he critiqued the links between Protestant Christianity, imperialism and capitalism, arguing that Christianity had become a “reactionary force” stifling social change (Wu 1963). Wu’s views were significantly different from the indigenous church movements which expressed no interest in politics or social change (Xu 2004:109), but in the late 1940s across China, including within Protestant churches, there was increasing support for the CPC.
Close to defeating the Nationalist Party (国民党) the CPC established the framework of a national government in the summer of 1949. Several prominent Chinese Protestants were invited as delegates to the first meeting of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC 中国人民政治协商会议), a political advisory organ of the United Front. The Protestant delegates included Y.T. Wu, Deng Yuzhi (邓裕志Cora Deng 1900-1996), and T.C. Chao (赵紫宸Zhao Zichen 1888-1979). After the official founding of the PRC in October 1949, Wu and the other Protestant CPPCC delegates wrote an open letter which stated that the role of foreign missionaries in China would change. The letter raised complicated issues in the history of foreign missions, including imperialism, denominationalism, and financial support (Wu et al 1963). In November 1949, this group of Protestant CPPCC delegates, together with representatives from the YMCA, YWCA and NCC, visited different areas of China to assess the implementation of the CPC state’s “freedom of religious belief” policy contained in China’s interim constitution, the Common Program (共同纲领). They discovered “serious problems” with the implementation of religious policy, and in April 1950 a group of nineteen leaders, led by Wu, went to Beijing to report to senior officials, including Zhou Enlai. Instead of following their original plan to report the problems they had identified, the group instead decided that it would be more prudent to write a statement of their political standpoint (Bays 2012:161). Further meetings with Zhou in May (2, 6, 13, and 20) led to a fifth and final draft of the founding document of the TSPM, “The Direction of Endeavour for Chinese Christianity in the Construction of New China” (中国基督教在新中国建设中努力的途径) also known as, “The Christian Manifesto” (基督教宣言) (Three-Self Reform Movement 1963). Some scholars have claimed that the Christian Manifesto was drafted by CCP officials (Chan 2012:873), but it is more likely that it was written by the Protestant leaders themselves, with Zhou’s input (Wickeri 1990). On July 28, 1950, forty Protestant leaders signed the Christian Manifesto and then promoted it. By August, they had collected 1,525 signatures from Chinese church leaders and lay believers (Xu 2004:115). The Manifesto reportedly amassed 400,000 signatures by 1954. It was published in full in the People’s Daily on September 23, 1950. In October 1950, at the NCC national meeting, the Manifesto was signed by 140 delegates, thus backing the formation of what was to become the TSPM (Bays 2012:162).
While there was undoubtedly broad support for the full indigenization of Christianity in China, the Manifesto established a clear political agenda for Chinese churches. The core message of the Manifesto was support for the CPC-led government and the state’s agenda of “anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism and anti-bureaucratic capitalism” (The Christian Manifesto 1963). Protestant Christianity’s extensive foreign networks meant that the state was determined to align Christianity with its political goals and key to this was purging imperialist influences, most of all within Christianity itself, including missionary agencies (Kindopp 2004:122-23). The change resulted in many missionaries exiting China in 1950, with most having left by 1951. Those that did not want to leave were expelled from the country.
During the initial drive to promote the Manifesto and establish a unified movement of Chinese Protestants, participation was largely voluntary. Into 1951, this campaign continued. At this time, local church life within the different denominations and church movements was largely “normal”: church gatherings took place, pastors were ordained, and outreach continued (Ying 2011:157). However, this changed markedly with the outbreak of the Korean War (1950-1953), as Chinese troops entered into North Korea in October 1950. This took “the CPC’s struggle with American imperialism to a new level and the tide of anti-imperialism affected its policy on Christianity” (Ying 2014:887). In March 1951, religious groups were ordered to prioritize the purging of imperialist influences. This was followed by conference in Beijing called by the State Affairs Council (SAC), which launched the “Christian Denunciation Movement” (基督教控诉运动) on April 19 and established the “Preparatory Committee for the Oppose-America, Assist-Korea Three-Self Reform Movement of the Christian Church (中国基督教抗美援朝、三自革新运动委员会筹备委员会)” on April 21, whose aims were anti-imperialist. The Denunciation Movement lasted into 1953 and coincided with the violent Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries” (镇压反革命运动), which had started in 1950. The Denunciation Movement aimed to purge Christianity in China from imperialist influences, including foreign missionaries. Liu Liangmo (刘良模 1909-1988), Secretary of the Preparatory Committee, even published an article titled “How to Hold a Successful Accusation [Denunciation] Meeting” on May 15, making the TSPM complicit in state suppression of and violence against Christians (Liu 1963). Other political campaigns implicated Chinese Christians, including the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, the Three-Anti (三反) Campaign (1951), and the Five-Anti (五反) Campaign (1952), leading to the denunciation, imprisonment or execution of many Christians.
In May 1951, Wu convened a meeting in Beijing to launch the Three-Self Reform Movement. At the First National Conference, which took place July 22-August 6, 1954, 139 members were appointed, forty-two of these to the Standing Committee, Wu was appointed as Chair, and the (first) Constitution was approved (Wickeri 1990:150). Some of the core leaders were “evangelical,” including Chen Chonggui (陈崇桂 Marcus Cheng, 1883-1963) and Jia Yuming (賈玉銘 1880-1964), bringing together a theologically diverse groups of Protestants. The term “Reform” was changed to “Patriotic” in the Movement’s name to discourage the idea that Christians would have to be reformed against their will or that the intention of the TSPM was to change Christian doctrine (China Christian Conference 1963). The TSPM was put under the supervision of the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB), (under the authority of the United Front) and RAB officials served as “advisers” to the TSPM (Bays 2012:164). With many foreign mission institutions such as schools and hospitals nationalized in the early 1950s, and foreign funds cut off in response to the freezing of Chinese assets in the United States after China’s involvement in the Korean War, the remaining Protestant institutions were dismantled or reformed after the official establishment of the TSPM (Xu 2004:116), including Bible schools and seminaries, thus signalling a more coercive approach to “uniting” Chinese Protestants.
Now with considerable legitimacy within the Protestant churches in China, the TSPM moved to suppress the groups and individuals who resisted joining it. Many mission churches, some independent churches and several indigenous movements joined up to the TSPM enthusiastically or at least backed it albeit with some reticence because there seemed no alternative. There were some dissenters, however, Wang Mingdao of the Christian Tabernacle (基督徒会堂) in Beijing being one of them. A staunch conservative, Wang labelled the TSPM a “modernist” (liberal) project, and in the 1950s he penned a number of open letters in Christian magazines, such as The Spiritual Food Quarterly (灵食季刊), stating his position and criticizing those involved, particularly Y.T. Wu (Ying 2010:108). Wu and others responded with their own essays. The state labelled dissenters as “counterrevolutionaries” (Ying 2014:893). Wang’s 1955 pamphlet “We, Because of Faith” called the TSPM leadership “unbelievers” (Wang 1963). He was arrested and imprisoned for over twenty years despite the fact that there was no legal case against him (Wickeri 1990:165). However, even churches and individuals who did not oppose the TSPM were subject to criticism and subsequently disbanded or arrested, including the Jesus Family, despite many members having signed The Manifesto. Ni Tuosheng did not resist the TSPM but was arrested on dubious charges and died in prison soon after. The Little Flock did not have a “clear trajectory of accommodation or rejection” (Dunch 2012:264), but Little Flock congregations were harassed nonetheless (Lee 2005:86-89). The state-led Anti-Rightist Campaign (反右运动) started in June 1957 and was extended to churches in November that year, leading to more harassment and arrests. Despite the True Jesus Church having had no links to foreign mission organizations and having a fully Chinese leadership, leaders were imprisoned during the Campaign in 1957 and churches were shut down (Autry 2013 42a). There can be no denying that the TSPM collaborated with the state in suppressing and eliminating Christian denominations, groups and individuals who did not want to join the TSPM (Bays 2008:484a). Targets were those who were “too influential or too popular” (Gao 1996:349). It is ironic that the TSPM leadership, who were the greatest beneficiaries of Western institutions, attacked imperialism so vehemently and that these same people “attacked most viciously…those that had made the most significant contributions to Chinese Protestantism’s realization of the three-self principles” (Xu 2004:118-19).
Having seemingly united a small majority of Protestants under the leadership of the CPC-state, and removed imperialist influences, the National TSPM Committee pushed for “united worship” (联合礼拜) in 1958 in an attempt to demolish the last vestiges of “denominationalism” which was regarded as a “tool of foreign infiltration” (Autry 2013:41b). Throughout the political campaigns and TSPM crusades, church attendance had been falling. The Great Leap Forward (大跃进), launched by the central state in February 1958, further eroded church attendance as citizens in rural and urban areas worked overtime to achieve impossible output goals and often attended political study sessions in the evenings. Falling congregation sizes facilitated the shutting down of churches and the merging of congregations into designated buildings; for example, in Shanghai, 208 churches were reduced to twenty-two, and in Beijing, sixty-five churches were reduced to four (Ying 2011:157). Church leaders were sent to factories or farms to work. A hymnal was published in 1958, the purpose of which was to unite Christians around a shared worship experience. Any texts used in church gatherings were vetted for political correctness. Denominational features were abandoned. Plans for unification of worship were published in Tian Feng, and mention some specific denominations by name, including the Little Flock, Salvation Army and Seventh-Day Adventists (Lü et al. 1963).
Following the political campaigns of the 1950s, the 1960s proved even more challenging for Christians, including those within the TSPM. The Socialist Education Movement (社会主义教育运动1962-1965) was a CPC attempt to remove “reactionary elements” from society, including “superstitious” beliefs. The launch of the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命) in May 1966 brought with it intense scrutiny of many citizens, and many Christians suffered at the hands of officials, Red Guards and even work colleagues. Almost all forms of public religion were effectively banned, the TSPM committees at all levels were disbanded, churches shut down, and even the state apparatus designed to manage religion ceased functioning (namely the United Front Work Department (UFWD 统一战线工作部) and the RAB). Christians in many parts of China did not stop their religious activities, even at the height of the Cultural Revolution in some areas (Kao 2009; Wang 2020).
At the end of the main Cultural Revolution era, a degree of normality returned to the political arena as CPC and government organs were rehabilitated, including the UFWD and the RAB in the early 1970s. Christians were more emboldened to operate more openly. In the late 1970s, some Christians who had worshipped in TSPM-affiliated churches in the 1960s before their closure quietly pushed for their re-opening. In 1978, some such churches began to re-open and Christianity was once again permitted a degree of public expression. Christians imprisoned without any legal basis were released and rehabilitated. Many of the surviving TSPM leaders at the national and local levels were approached by UFWD or RAB officials and tasked with reviving the TSPM committees, although the CPC leadership assumed that the number of Christians was small and predominantly elderly (Dunch 2008:155). In March 1980, the interim National TSPM Committee sent a letter to Christians in China, which reaffirmed the “correct” path established by the CPC and declared that Christianity in China was no longer a tool of imperialism, and no longer a foreign religion. It also called on Christians to help realize the state’s “Four Modernizations” goal (TSPM 2000). On October 6-13, 1980, the Third National Christian Conference was held in Nanjing. K.H. Ting (丁光训 Ding Guangxun 1915-2012) was elected Chairperson of the TSPM and President of the newly-formed China Christian Council (CCC 中国基督教协会), responsible for the handling of church affairs. Ting retired from both organizations in 1997. Together, the TSPM and CCC work closely together and are collectively referred to as the “Two Committees” (两会).
K.H. Ting, often called Bishop Ting (or Bishop Ding), was as influential a figure on the TSPM (and CCC) in the Reform Era as Y.T. Wu was in the 1950s and 1960s, and although not without his critics, was certainly less controversial than Wu. He was made Anglican Bishop of Zhejiang in 1955, not long before denominations were banned by the TSPM. There are claims that Ting was a secret CPC member and that he worked in the CPC base in Yan’an in 1937 (Hunter & Chan 1993:89). No substantial evidence has corroborated this claim. Ting took up the position of Principal of Jinling Union Theological Seminary (金陵协和神学院) in 1953, and continued in the role from 1980. From 1980 he held a variety of positions outside of the TSPM/CCC, including as Director of Religious Studies at Nanjing University, Member of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, and Vice-Chairperson of the CPPCC (Hunter and Chan 1993:89).
Although criticized for supporting Maoist policies and collaborating with the authorities in the repression of Protestant groups and individuals in the 1950s, Ting used his leadership in the TSPM/CCC and his political positions to speak on behalf of Protestant Christians. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Ting pushed the state for the return of church properties confiscated in the 1950s and 1960s, promoted theological training in seminaries and in grassroots training programs, and was at times outspoken about the restrictive nature of the state’s policy on religion. For example, Ting defended the rights of Chinese Christians to meet in homes and in 1988 even asked the RAB to end the harassment of such meetings. In 1989, Ting publicly supported the student and worker protests which culminated in the crackdown in Tian’anmen Square in Beijing and other places (Hunter and Chan 1993:95). In February 1989, Ting claimed that the TSPM would be dissolved by 1991 during an interview with a Christian news agency in the U.S. (Hunter and Chan 1993:94), though this idea was dropped in the aftermath of Tian’anmen. One scholar aptly described Ting as “more equipped than the more political leaders of the 1950s to represent Chinese Protestants to the outside world, to advocate for the church with Chinese state and party bureaucrats, and to reach out to the theologically conservative believers who comprised the majority of Chinese Protestants, within and outside official churches” (Dunch 2012:270). No TSPM or CCC leader has been as vocal about defending the rights of Chinese Christians or extending the space for Christian churches to operate as Ting.
Throughout the Reform Era and into the present day, the TSPM/CCC remain the sole officially-recognized Protestant organizations through which Chinese Protestants can register to meet and worship legally. Into the new millennium, there was a relatively high degree of freedom for TSPM-affiliated congregations to proselytize, establish charitable enterprises, and collaborate with churches outside of the TSPM/CCC system. This was largely due to a more laissez faire approach to religion under President Hu Jintao’s (胡锦涛 1942-) leadership. It was also partly due to an increasingly younger leadership in TSPM-affiliated congregations who were more willing to take risks and less entrenched in their views about the exclusivity of the TSPM/CCC system. Since the current leadership took office in 2012 and 2013, there has been a rapid retreat from the previous laissez faire treatment of religion.
The state is concerned about the rapid growth of Christianity, and has taken measures to curb this growth. The TSPM/CCC have become the focus of an ideological re-orienting of Protestant Christianity in an attempt to align it more closely to CPC goals. This re-politicization of the TSPM/CCC has been evident in its official statements, and in a re-emphasis on the bodies’ roles in supporting the leadership of the CPC, promoting patriotism, and celebrating important political anniversaries. The state has also been bolder in silencing dissenting voices. In 2015, Pastor Gu Yuese (顾约瑟 Joseph Gu b.d. unknown), Pastor of Chongyi Church (崇一堂) in Hangzhou and President of the Zhejiang Christian Council, penned an open letter criticizing the state’s forced removal of crosses and demolition of churches in the province which began in 2014. He was subsequently arrested in January 2016 on dubious charges and removed from all leadership positions. He remains under house arrest. Gu was the most senior TSPM/CCC leader to be arrested since the Cultural Revolution. Other TSPM-affiliated church leaders critical of state actions have also been arrested.
The events in Zhejiang impacted TSPM-affiliated congregations across the country and resulted in increasing distrust of the state’s view of Christianity (McLeister 2018). A raft of new legislation on religion since 2018 has brought further restrictions to TSPM-affiliated congregations, and despite the adeptness of many church leaders to negotiate and circumvent some elements of the legislation, it has had a dulling effect on numbers attending TSPM-affiliated congregations. Some church leaders have quit their roles due to the increase in political pressure (McLeister 2025).
DOCTRINES/BELIEFS
The TSPM/CCC are not a church but are bodies founded on political principles which constitute “a loose [Christian] fellowship with many diverse views” (Chan 2012:878). However, there is a general division in beliefs and doctrines of the TSPM/CCC between the top leadership of the National TSPM/CCC (including some elites within seminaries and provincial TSPM/CCC committees) and the leadership of local-level TSPM/CCC committees and TSPM-affiliated congregations. While the fundamental beliefs of the TSPM/CCC could be described broadly as “evangelical,” the TSPM/CCC elites have tended to be more progressive and politically-oriented in their theology whereas grassroots TSPM/CCC committee and church leaders have tended to be more conservative and/or fundamentalist. This is, however, a somewhat crude division and there have been a number of elite TSPM/CCC leaders who were theologically evangelical, such as the late Wang Weifan (汪维藩 1927-2015) (Yao 2016).
The TSPM/CCC Church Order of Protestant Churches in China, 2018 (中国基督教教会规章) (TSPM/CCC 2018) outlines the core beliefs. The Church Order takes the Bible, the Apostles’ Creed and the Nicene Creed as foundational to faith (Article 6). Central beliefs include a triune God (Father, Son and Holy Spirit); a literal birth, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ; a Holy Spirit who works in individuals to lead them to repentance and in the church to build it up. Jesus will return to judge the world and those with faith in him will be resurrected and enjoy eternal life. These beliefs are explained in more detail in the Catechism (要道问答) produced by the CCC (CCC 2012). The Catechism, first published in 1983 (revised in 2023), covers one hundred and twenty points of faith and doctrine, divided into seven sections: the Bible, God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit, salvation, the church, and the saints. These statements of faith are not only attempts to unite Chinese Christians around shared beliefs, but also to defend the TSPM/CCC from what are regarded as “heretical” groups.
However, these statements of belief need to be placed in context alongside the key beliefs on which the TSPM/CCC were founded (eg, “Love [Your] Country, Love [Your] Religion,” anti-imperialism), as well as more recent developments in theology. After the early 1980s, there was much less discussion of anti-imperialism, but In March 2019, Xu Xiaohong, Chairperson of the National TSPM Committee, berated the use of Christianity by “Western powers” to bring instability to China and the CPC (Gan 2019). The TSPM and CCC constitutions (revised 2023), both contain identical text stating that the main purposes of the Committees are to, “Support the leadership of the Communist Party of China, support the socialist system, and study and implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (Article 3). Additional goals are for the TSPM/CCC to stick to the Three-Self principles, to unite and lead believers in China to be patriotic and to glorify God and benefit people, and to stick to the “Sinicization” (中国化) of Protestant Christianity and “Theological Reconstruction” (神学思想建设) (Article 3).
Sinicization refers to a project launched by the central state in 2015 which calls on all recognized religions in China to adapt to essentialized ideals of (Han) Chinese culture and to fully support the CPC’s goals (Madsen 2021). It has become a major focus of the previous (2018-2022) and current (2023-2027) Work Plans of the TSPM/CCC. However, since the fundamental purpose of the Sinicization project is to encourage religions in China to actively support the CPC’s goals, it is not radically different from the demands of previous regimes, such as the “Harmonious Society” goals of the Hu leadership, or the “Adaptation to Socialism” goals of the Jiang Zemin leadership. Although the National and Provincial TSPM/CC(C)’s have been promoting its realization, not all local-level TSPM/CCC’s and TSPM-affiliated churches are engaging with it, with some (perhaps many) church leaders viewing Sinicization as a political project that does not benefit the church (McLeister 2025). Even at the highest levels of the TSPM/CCC system, at least some of the use of political rhetoric (such as Sinicization) is performative, and it should not be assumed that there is necessarily a deep “belief” in the state’s political goals. Some leaders within the TSPM/CCC system choose to parrot political language as a means of placating the state and carving out space for Christianity (McLeister 2025).
Theological Reconstruction refers to an attempt by K.H. Ting to develop Chinese Protestant theology to help it adapt better to socialist society (Dunch 2008). Theological Reconstruction was formally launched at a TSPM/CCC conference in November 1998 in Jinan (Shandong). Unlike Sinicization, it is not a state-initiated project. Ting wanted to challenge “fundamentalist” theology which he felt many Chinese Christians accepted uncritically (Wickeri 2007:340), not only at the grassroots but by many TSPM seminary faculty as well. At its core, Ting argued that the doctrine of justification needed to be “downplayed” (淡化) because he felt this doctrine over-emphasized a separation between Christians and non-Christians. By emphasizing “good works” and seeing sin as structural as well as personal, Ting hoped to find common points of contact between Christians and non-Christians, and to emphasize Christian witness in wider society (Chow 2018; Wickeri 2007). Ting’s ideas continue to be controversial, with some within the TSPM/CCC rejecting them outright as an attack on core Protestant beliefs (Vala 2018). Others argue that his ideas have not been understood sufficiently. In TSPM-affiliated churches, there is little discussion of Theological Reconstruction. However, Ting’s writings are still debated and discussed by TSPM/CCC leaders and seminary faculty, and should therefore be included in a broad survey of the TSPM/CCC’s doctrines and beliefs.
The TSPM continues to downplay “denominationalism” in official publications, but the reality in TSPM-affiliated churches reflects a partial return to specific denominational beliefs; for example, the Seventh-Day Adventists (Chow 2021), the True Jesus Church (Inouye 2018) or the Little Flock (Bays 2012). Although some scholars have claimed that TSPM-affiliated church leaders are discouraged from preaching on some topics such as eschatology and faith-healing (Hunter and Chan 2012:816), evidence suggests that these aspects of faith are taught in some churches (McLeister 2019b).
RITUALS/PRACTICES
The TSPM/CCC recognize the celebration of two sacraments common to many forms of Christianity: holy communion and baptism. According to the Church Order, only ordained clergy are permitted to administer holy communion and baptism (Article 15). Holy communion is only supposed to be taken by baptized believers, but this is not always strictly enforced (Article 14). Baptism takes two forms, full immersion or sprinkling. Christian weddings and funerals are also recognized by the TSPM/CCC but there are few stipulations on how these should be conducted other than that ordained clergy should provide some form of marriage counselling for those getting married (Article 20) and that funerals should be conducted in an orderly manner and that expenditure should not be excessive (Article 21). The church festivals of Christmas and Easter are recognized in the Church Order. Some TSPM-affiliated churches also celebrate Harvest Thanksgiving (McLeister 2013a). The Church Order outlines a number of education and experience qualifications for each clerical position (Article 28), their duties (Article 29) and the procedures for consecration or ordination (Article 30).
The re-politicization of the TSPM/CCC has resulted in an increasing emphasis on the ritualistic display of CPC symbols in TSPM seminaries, at TSPM/CCC meetings, and in TSPM-affiliated churches. In 2018, the state launched the “Four Enters” campaign, forcing TSPM-affiliated churches to fly the Chinese state flag (McLeister 2025:25). Flag-raising ceremonies and the singing of “patriotic songs” (唱红歌) have become common in TSPM seminaries and TSPM/CC(C) meetings at the national, provincial and local levels.
There is a wide range of TSPM-affiliated churches, and therefore substantial diversity in practices; for example, some TSPM-affiliated congregations practice Spirit-filled prayer meetings, complete with glossolalia (McLeister 2019b), fasting, prayers for healing and exorcisms of evil spirits are also practiced in some TSPM-affiliated congregations (McLeister 2019b) while TSPM-affiliated True Jesus Churches practice feet-washing (Inouye 2018). Although state religious policy prohibits attempts at evangelism in public spaces, TSPM-affiliated churches have been known to engage in the public distribution of “gospel leaflets” and other outreach activities (McLeister 2012; McLeister 2021).
ORGANIZATION/LEADERSHIP
The TSPM (together with the CCC) is a mass patriotic religious organization, not a church, although it arguably fulfils some ecclesiastical functions (training and ordination of clergy, provision of a Church Order). The TSPM and CCC both have national committees named National Committee of Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Church in China (中国基督教三自爱国运动委员会 National TSPM) and China Christian Council (中国基督教协会 CCC). There are TSPM committees at the provincial, municipal and district/county levels. All provinces have a provincial TSPM except for Tibet. There are Christian Councils (CC) at the provincial, municipal and some district/county levels. The National Chinese Christian Conference (中国基督教代表会议 NCCC) is the highest authority of both the TSPM and the CCC. It is made up of representatives elected by the National TSPM and CCC, the provincial TSPMs and CCs, Nanjing Union Theological Seminary, and the National Associations of the Young Men‘s Christian Association of China (中华基督教青年会全国协会) and Young Women’s Christian Association of China (中华基督教女青年会全国协会). The NCCC meets every five years and elects the leadership of the National TSPM and CCC. The Standing Committees of the National TSPM and CCC hold a Plenary together every two years. The NCCC sometimes appoints small groups for specific tasks. The Standing Committees of each body meet independently more regularly (CCC 2023; TSPM 2023). Traditionally, it was common for the equivalent positions in the TSPM/CCC (or CC) to be held by the same person; for example, K.H. Ting held the positions of Chairperson of the National TSPM and President of the CCC concurrently. However, it is now more common for the equivalent positions in both bodies to be held by different persons at any one time.
The entire structure of the TSPM and CCC/CC’s is not fully hierarchical and is divided into two levels. The upper level comprises the National TSPM/CCC and the provincial-level TSPM/CCs. Provincial-level TSPM/CCs should adhere to the directives of the National TSPM and CCC (TSPM Constitution Article 6.9 and CCC Constitution Article 7.10). There is no stipulation that local-level TSPM/CCs should obey provincial-level TSPM/CCs. However, there is a degree of control from the National TSPM/CCC (at least in theory). Article 4 of the Church Order stipulates that local-level TSPM/CCs have an obligation to comply with the Church Order. In addition, Church Orders drafted by TSPM/CCs are not allowed to contradict in any way the Church Order promulgated by the National TSPM/CCC (Church Order Article 5). The ordination of church pastors is ultimately decided by provincial-level TSPM/CCs because local-level TSPM/CCs must send the nomination for ordination to the province for approval (Church Order Article 30). There is also a degree of influence from provincial-level TSPM/CCs to local-level TSPM/CCs by membership, since leaders of local-level TSPM/CCs can concurrently hold a post in the provincial-level TSPM/CC.
The lower level comprises local-level TSPM/CCs and individual TSPM-affiliated congregations. Individual churches and meeting points are required to register with the state to be recognized as approved “religious activities venues” (宗教活动场所). Local-level TSPM/CCs are responsible for guiding and supervising all aspects of the ministry of individual churches and meeting points registered through them (Church Order Article 40). The level of guidance and supervision varies: some local-level TSPM/CCs can be very controlling towards individual congregations, some enjoy a broad latitude of freedom, and some TSPM/CCs can even be very supportive of church activities which push the boundaries of what the state views as acceptable religious activity (McLeister 2013a; McLeister 2021; See also Vala 2020).
The Church Order recognizes the following church leadership positions: Bishop (主教), Pastor (牧师) (including Associate Pastor 副牧师, also called Teacher 教师 in some places) and Elder (长老) (Article 27) and the process for ordination. There are currently no bishops in the TSPM/CCC system. The last two bishops to be consecrated were Sun Yanli (孙彦理 1914-1995) and Shen Yifan (沈以藩1928-1994) in 1988, and while the Church Order has retained the position of bishop, it is largely defunct due to theological disagreements (Guo 2025). The ordination of leaders in individual churches includes pastors and elders, whose ordination must be approved by the TSPM/CC. Their ordination is also subject to political checks by the state. Other leadership positions can include Preachers (传道人), Deacons (执事) and volunteer lay church workers (同工). Preachers are generally graduates of TSPM seminaries or Bible schools and are tasked with preaching and pastoral duties. Before being nominated for seminary enrolment, applicants must be approved by the TSPM/CC and are also subject to political background checks. Individual congregations themselves decide on the appointment of deacons and lay church workers. However, individual congregations can also wield significant influence on the ordination of pastors and elders, as well as their election to TSPM/CC positions, even if they have state approval (See McLeister 2019b).
What exactly constitutes a TSPM-affiliated congregation is sometimes ambiguous. Churches (堂) and meeting points (聚会点) which are formally registered with the state through the local TSPM/CC are clearly TSPM-affiliated congregations. However, there is a sizable number of congregations which have a connection to the TSPM/CC system but which are not formally registered. This connection would usually take the form of a leader or leaders of the unregistered congregation being known to the leadership of a church or meeting point who can advocate for the group to the TSPM/CC or state organs. Some of these groups are unable to register because they do not yet fulfil the basic requirements to do so. Others may not wish to register but know that it is politically expedient to make a connection with a TSPM-affiliated congregation or leader, albeit in an informal manner. There is, therefore, significant diversity in TSPM-affiliated congregations, including congregations predominantly made up of young professionals, migrant workers, a specific ethnic minority, or the Deaf (McLeister 2013b; McLeister 2019a; McLeister 2024), as well as congregations who adhere to specific denominational traditions, such as the Seventh-Day Adventists (Chow 2021), the True Jesus Church (Autry 2013; Inouye 2018) or the Little Flock (Bays 2012). Some local TSPM/CCs and TSPM-affiliated congregations network with “house churches” (家庭教会), seminaries which operate outside the TSPM/CCC system, and overseas Christian organizations (McLeister 20024; Vala 2009).
The National TSPM/CCC and TSPM/CCs at all levels, as well as individual TSPM-affiliated congregations, are all subject to state supervision by a number of state organs. The primary state organ is the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and the National Religious Affairs Commission (NRAC 国家宗教事务局 formerly called the State Administration for Religious Affairs SARA). The NRAC was an independent government organ until 2018 when it was absorbed into the UFWD. It still functions under the name NRAC but does not have any leadership independent of the UFWD. The UFWD oversees the formulation and development of policy on religion, which incorporates the oversight of religious associations and their activities. Other state organs such as subdistrict offices (街道办事处), residents’ committees (居民委员会) and village committees (村民委员会) also have responsibility for the oversight of religious activities in many places (McLeister 2025).
The TSPM/CCC are also involved in theological education, charity work and Bible printing. In an attempt to train clergy in three-self principles and patriotism and to equip church leaders, the TSPM/CCC run their own seminaries; one national seminary (Jinling Union Theological Seminary, often referred to as Nanjing Seminary) and a number of regional and provincial seminaries. Seminaries receive funding from the TSPM/CCC and the state (Vala 2009). There are also a number of Bible schools and short-term theological training programs run by local-level TSPM/CCs and individual churches. As a further extension of its educational training, the TSPM/CCC publishes books and other training materials. Tian Feng: The Magazine of the Christian Church in China (天风: 中国基督教杂志) is an official publication of the TSPM. Its content includes official communications from the TSPM and the CCC, devotional and spiritual articles, and commentary on religious policy. Other key publications include Nanjing Theological Review (金陵神学志), published by Jinling Union Theological Seminary, and Chinese Theological Review, an English-language journal. The TSPM/CCC contributes to charity work through The Amity Foundation (爱德基金会), headquartered in Nanjing, with offices in Hong Kong and Geneva. It is a voluntary charitable organization established in 1985 by Chinese Christians. In mainland China, it is involved in a range of programs relating to disaster relief, and health and social care. The Nanjing Amity Printing Company (南京爱德印刷有限公司), part of The Amity Foundation, is a joint venture together with the United Bible Societies, and was established in 1988. As of 2025, it has printed over 279 million Bibles, some in Chinese and other languages used in China, and some in a range of other languages for export.
ISSUES/CHALLENGES
As religious bodies whose role is to represent Protestant Christians in China while at the same time cooperate with the state in implementing official policy on religion, the TSPM/CCC and the TSPM-affiliated churches are required to walk a fine line at times. If the TSPM/CCC or TSPM-affiliated church leaders are deemed to be too political by their Protestant constituency, they lose religious legitimacy and are unable to carry out their spiritual mandate. Similarly, if they do not adhere to demands from the state, then they lose political legitimacy and therefore their space to operate. While many leaders are adept at negotiating these demands, this has undoubtedly become more challenging in recent years with the re-politicization of religion (McLeister 2025).
The TSPM/CCC has not addressed the highly-politicized debates and violence of the 1950s and 1960s, and this continues to play a role in the rejection of the TSPM/CCC by significant numbers of Protestants in China today. Some outside the TSPM/CCC system regard its leadership as “hypocrites” or “collaborators with the ‘Anti-Christ’” (Hunter and Chan 1993:87). If the TSPM/CCC are determined to persuade outsiders to join them, then historical issues need to be addressed, although this is unlikely to happen in the current political climate.
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Publication Date:
3 December 2025