ADNAN OKTAR TIMELINE
1956: Adnan Oktar, the leader of the movement, was born named Harun Yahya, in Ankara, Turkey.
1979: Oktar began his Islamic activism while studying interior design at Mimar Sinan University.
1986: Oktar enrolled in the Philosophy Department of Istanbul University. He published his first book, Judaism and Freemasonry.
1987: Oktar was arrested and charged with promoting a theocratic revolution, for which he had to serve one day in prison and probably a period of eight months in a mental hospital.
1990: Oktar established the Science Research Foundation (Bilim Araştırma Vakfı =BAV ) which promoted creationism against the theory of evolution, and which organized conferences and panels on this subject
1991: Oktar was detained after a father accused him of forcing his daughter into marriage, but the case was dismissed. However, a subsequent search of his Istanbul home led to a lawsuit over narcotics possession, which also was eventually dismissed.
1999: Oktar was arrested along with eighty-five of his followers on charges of forming a criminal organization involved in activities like blackmail, extortion, and sexual misconduct. This arrest was part of a larger Turkish operation against his organization. Although the case drew significant public attention, Oktar was not jailed.
2006: Oktar published The Atlas of Creation. The book argued against the theory of evolution and presented Oktar’s interpretation of Islamic creationism. He also argued that Darwin’s theory of evolution is at the root of global terrorism (Hürriyet).
2007-2008: The movement started receiving international attention. Turkish courts temporarily blocked access to several websites, including those operated by Oktar.
2011: Oktar’s television channel, A9 TV, began broadcasting.
2017: Oktar faced rising public criticism, with Turkish religious authorities and conservative commentators condemning his TV shows as un-Islamic and inappropriate.
2018: Oktar was arrested along with 200 followers on various charges.
2022 (November 17): Oktar was sentenced to 8,658 years in prison; his adherents also faced lengthy jail sentences.
2024 (July): The Court of Cassation ruled on Oktar’s appeal of his sentence, upholding the trial court sentence.
FOUNDER/GROUP HISTORY
Within the small body of academic literature on Adnan Oktar’s movement, there is a debate about how the movement should be classified. Some scholars refer to it as an enterprise (Solberg 2013), while others consider it a sect or a cult (Çetin 2016; White 2012), or a new religious movement (NRM) as part of the broader category of NRMs (Tiryaki 2021). The characteristics of NRMs are well-analyzed in Lewis (2008) and The Oxford Handbook of New Religious Movements (2008). In the Turkish media, Oktar and his followers are often described as a religious community led by Adnan Oktar. The history of the Adnan Oktar movement, often referred to as the Adnan Oktar Organization or “Harun Yahya,” reflects the complex interplay between religious movements and state power in Turkey, particularly under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Adnan Oktar was born in 1956 into a secular middle-class family in Ankara as Adnan Arslanoğulları. [Image at right] He claims that his genealogy traces back to the Prophet Muhammad. Oktar is a Turkish advocate of i‘jaz ‘ilmi (a doctrine asserting the miraculous quality of the Qur’ān in both content and form) and Islamic creationism. He is considered a modernist Muslim proselytizer who primarily addresses a Westernized audience in Turkey (Çakır 1990). In 1979, he moved to Istanbul to study interior architecture at Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University. As a Sunni zealot, he attracted young people from socially active, prosperous, and recently religious families in Istanbul. According to Edip Yüksel (a Kurdish American activist and prominent figure of the Qur’anist movement, a Turkish author, activist, and scholar known for his work on Islamic reform and his advocacy for a rationalist interpretation of the Qur’an), Oktar drew significant inspiration from Said Nursi, shaping his religious outreach in a manner similar to Nursi’s and frequently citing him as a key source of authority.
Oktar met Edip Yüksel in the late 1980s. Yüksel had abandoned Islamism in 1986 and adopted the “Qur’an-alone” theology expounded by Rashad Khalifa, the Egyptian-American sheikh who inspired United Submitters International (Solberg 2013). According to Çakır, Oktar became convinced of Yüksel’s Qur’anist ideas after meeting him in the late 1980s (Çakır 1990).
Oktar assembled a group of 25-30 people at Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University who joined his activities, and this group began giving presentations at various university platforms. Like Nursi, Oktar argued against Marxism and Darwin’s theory of evolution, which he believed promoted materialism, atheism, and derivative ideologies. Oktar sought to demonstrate that the truth of the Qur’an both precedes and is confirmed by science (Dupret and Gutron 2021).
In 1986, Oktar joined the Philosophy Department at Istanbul University, attracting numerous students, particularly from the prestigious Bosphorus University. This move brought him increased media attention, and his name began appearing frequently in headlines. That year, he published a book (under the pen name Harun Yahya) titled Yahudilik ve Masonluk (Judaism and Freemasonry), alleging that state offices, universities, political groups, and the media were influenced by a “hidden group.” The book accused Jews and Masons in Turkey of seeking to erode the spiritual, religious, and moral values of the Turkish people, aiming to degrade them according to a “distorted Torah.” Additionally, they were accused of promoting evolution, irreligion, and immorality for materialistic purposes. In 1995, Oktar published another antisemitic book under the name Harun Yahya titled The Holocaust Lie: The Secret History of Zionist-Nazi Collaboration and the Truth Behind the ‘Jewish Holocaust’ Lie (Soykırım yalanı: Siyonist-Nazi işbirliğinin gizli tarihi ve “Yahudi Soykırımı” yalanının içyüzü). Despite his earlier antisemitic publications, Oktar became a prominent advocate for peace and interfaith dialogue in the 2000s, particularly in the second decade of the 2000s, with a notable emphasis on engaging with Jewish religious leaders. He publicly denounced antisemitism, and articles under his name expressing strong opposition to it appeared in numerous Jewish media outlets, including the Jerusalem Post, a leading Israeli newspaper. Following his earlier publications, Oktar was prosecuted for breaching Law No. 5816 on Crimes Committed Against Atatürk after giving an interview to the Turkish newspaper Bulvar (Hürriyet 1999). Oktar was charged of promoting a theocratic revolution and According to Tiryaki (2021), Oktar was detained for making statements contrary to Atatürkism and secularism. The allegation was also interpreted as an insult to the Turkish military regime. Oktar claimed at the State Security Court Prosecutor’s Office that his mental health had deteriorated due to excessive reading and that he was undergoing treatment, adding that he had been misunderstood by reporters. The investigation against Oktar was eventually closed with a decision not to prosecute, and he was released after one day in detention. However, he was transferred to Bakırköy Mental and Nervous Diseases Hospital, where he spent ten months under surveillance. Later on, in the 1990s, the movement launched a series of advertising campaigns under the BAV framework (See below), profiling itself as an Atatürkist organization. Until the late 1980s, Oktar’s attitude toward Atatürk was more or less aligned with the Islamist circles of the time, that is, highly critical. However, in the 2000s, Oktar and his associates began to promote Atatürk and Atatürkism on a large scale, which could have been a tactical move to avoid further trouble with the authorities.
The emergence and initial success of the Adnan Oktar Movement in Turkey during the 1980s must be understood as part of the broader Islamic revival gaining momentum during that period. This revival was influenced by the rise of political Islam and the evolution of Islamic revivalism into a global phenomenon, as well as the socio-political conditions in Turkey. Throughout the 1980s, the movement was perceived as a relatively conservative group practicing and promoting “mainstream” Sunni Islam, albeit with a modern urban image. The media began referring to the group as Adnan Hocacılar (adherents of Adnan Hoca) or Adnancılar, and it gained popularity due to its association with a high-society lifestyle.
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Oktar’s movement became more organized, and his messages took on a messianic form. Oktar started leveraging a media-savvy approach to spread his ideas, utilizing glossy publications, television broadcasts, and online platforms to reach a broad audience. This strategy was somewhat unique among Turkish religious movements, as Oktar combined traditional Islamic messages with an aesthetically modern and often controversial presentation style (Aviv 2022).
Oktar began to refine the structure of his group’s activities. Group members were allocated tasks and functions according to their capacities and expertise. The BAV became the main platform for group activities and the public face of the community, centered around Oktar; it organized conferences and advertising campaigns and distributed a large number of books for free. After the “soft coup” (or “28 February process,” referring to the period of political and social pressure in Turkey from 1997 to 2002, marked by military and secularist interventions aimed at curbing the influence of political Islam and Islamist groups), the secularist press published reports indicating close ties between the Islamist ruling party Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and Oktar.
In the mid-1990s, the Adnan Oktar movement began to focus more on the theory of evolution, a topic with which it would eventually be closely associated. It would come to define its profile and niche, first in Turkey and then internationally: the campaign against the theory of evolution and the formulation of a distinct form of Islamic creation
In addition to publishing many books, he founded the Science Research Foundation (Bilim Araştırma Vakfı [BAV]) in 1990, of which Oktar is president, to promote creationism, and the National Values Preservation Foundation (Milli Değerleri Koruma Vakfı [MDKV]) in 1995 to promote moral values, although Oktar himself has no credentials as a specialist in Islamic theology.
As aforementioned, Oktar was detained in 1999. A parliament member notably compared the significance of incarcerating Oktar to that of jailing Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdish PKK group. Indeed, the scandals that erupted in 1999 seriously damaged Oktar’s and BAV’s already tarnished image in Turkey. Many members left the community (Oktar claimed that the movement had around 100,000 members between 1979 and 1990), leading to expectations of the community’s decline from this point onward.
Possibly in response to its declining public image as a religious community once opposed to Atatürk, the movement sought to improve its reputation by highlighting Oktar’s charismatic leadership and blending religious conservatism with modern media strategies. As a result, the movement began rebranding itself as a popular pro-Western movement. Thus, in the 2000s, a significant shift occurred as the movement distanced itself from the anti-Zionist rhetoric prevalent in Turkey’s Islamist discourse and instead aligned with a modernist neo-Nurcu approach, embracing a more liberal interpretation of Islam. Oktar began promoting interfaith dialogue which drew criticism from other religious groups. Concurrently, the BAV evolved into a radical fundamentalist foundation. It focused on presenting the Qur’an as the ultimate truth, while simultaneously supporting Atatürk and distancing itself from traditional Islamic interpretations to foster a more liberal Islam. Despite general Islamic opinion viewing Oktar’s work as marginal and un-Islamic, his publications continued to garner significant attention due to their extensive media presence, including books, websites, and TV content. Visibility expanded internationally through translations, thereby building a global following (Bora 2017; Solberg 2013; Bardakçı 2010).
At the same time, beginning of the 2000s, the movement began publishing their books, first in English and later in other languages. These books were made available in Islamic bookstores worldwide, could be purchased for a low price or were offered for free, and had been designed with an attractive and lavish layout featuring abundant full-color illustrations. They present Islamic topics in a simple and straight-forward manner and were often made into high-resolution videos freely downloadable on the Internet. The movement also produced videos based on the books, often using unaccredited BBC or Discovery Channel footage. All Oktar’s books on science-related topics stress the might, sublimity, and majesty of God. A subset of his critical work challenges materialism, evolution, Darwinism, and atheism. According to Oktar’s website, over 300 books translated to 73 languages have been published under Oktar’s name, though probably not all were authored by him personally. The movement published: books, booklets, pamphlets, children’s books, journals, documentaries, audiobooks, CDs, posters and over a hundred websites. In 2007, for example, Oktar sent thousands of unsolicited copies of his Atlas of Creation, promoting Islam and creationism, to schools and colleges in several European countries and the United States. It was also around this time that the movement began to utilize the Internet as a marketing channel by creating a network of websites. Furthermore, after 2007, Oktar began to assume an increasingly visible and public role. He began to give frequent interviews to international media outlets, and in September 2008, he held an international press conference in Cırağan Palace, one of the most exclusive hotels in Istanbul. Shortly thereafter, Oktar began to appear on local Turkish television channels in the Black Sea and Middle East regions, giving interviews and hosting his own shows. Over the years, including during the 2000s, Oktar and his disciples faced numerous legal challenges but consistently avoided punishment. For instance, in 2008, Oktar was sentenced to three years in prison for establishing an illegal organization for personal gain. However, Oktar and the BAV appealed the decision, and on December 28, 2009, the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned the conviction.
In 2011, the movement founded its own satellite television station, A9 TV, which broadcasted on various cable networks in Turkey and streamed live over the Internet. A9 TV broadcasts documentaries based on Oktar’s works and featured talk shows with Oktar as the host. These talk shows, known as sohbetler (sohbet means “conversation,” and in Sufism, it is an essential spiritual practice, that is, a spiritual transaction between the disciple and the head of a dervish order, the sheikh, that relies on ancient oral storytelling traditions and practices), have become the main platform Oktar uses to reach out to audiences both in Turkey and abroad, and it has led to a new phase in both fame and notoriety for Oktar. However, Oktar’s talk shows are not a conversation between equals because his followers are rather submissive, and disapproval or criticism of their leader is out of the question in their “harmonious” group. As stated above, for Oktar, the most important factor in this change occurred at the intellectual level regarding interpreting the Qur’an and the hadiths. Oktar’s shows stream live and are translated into English in real time. He is not the first Islamic leader to broadcast on television. Islamic televangelism on Turkish television has shifted from a secular perspective toward a more devout Islamist one. Oktar’s televangelism on A9 TV exemplifies the meeting point between a small movement’s marginal religious practices and the popular realm of television (Çetin 2016) Furthermore, television programs have increased the movement’s impact and visibility and have exposed it to new economic and other initiatives as well as collaborations both inside and outside Turkey. Furthermore, these shows, as well as other new media technology, have helped the movement recruit young, good looking, well educated, and affluent people. Oktar’s show prompted a further shift in the movement’s ideology: The movement, which adopted a strict Islamic approach in the first few years, was strict about women wearing the chador. Women continued to wear chadors until 1986, but from the 1986-1990 period onward, they gradually stopped doing so (Solberg 2013) as a result, they lightened their hair, then they started to reveal their hair, hands, and faces by wearing loose shirts and trousers. Gradually, they began to compromise regarding their understanding of veiling. Female disciples continued to change their appearance from the 1990s until 2012. Donning tighter trousers, clothes that were partially open at the neck, uncovered hair, and make-up, they began to act completely in contrast to the Islamic concept of veiling. With the opening of A9 TV and the movement’s media world, female followers began to take on a mediatic appearance. Over time, this situation reached such a level that women belonging to the movement were escorting wealthy businessmen and were used in pornography and blackmail, thus giving the movement financial power and human resources (Tiryaki 2021). Female followers of the movement gradually began to serve the movement for sexual purposes, as the movement evolved into a criminal organization. The movement’s members accused of zina (an Islamic legal term referring to unlawful sexual intercourse) claimed in an online campaign that they had not committed zina because none of the women in the group were married; that is, because zina refers to sexual relations with “forbidden” women, such as married women, they cannot be accused of it. Nevertheless, Oktar tried to justify these aspects by referring to Islamic tradition. For example, in a program, Oktar claimed that there were many hadiths, indicating that the prophet liked blonde hair. In 2018, he stated that the “Bikini is [the] Islamic veil” (Aviv, 2022). Former movement members have claimed that the movement engaged in practices that deviate greatly from what is acceptable to Sunni Islam, such as ritual prayers three and some claim two instead of five times per day and allowing people to pray without performing abdest (ritual washing) or allowing women to pray without covering their head. This also reflects the changing zeitgeist in Turkey and the marginalization of the Islamist agendas in favor of moderate Islam.
The failed coup attempt in July 2016 marked a significant turning point in Turkey, particularly in the relationship between the state and various religious movements. Erdoğan’s government responded to the coup attempt with a sweeping crackdown on groups it deemed a threat to national security or ideological unity, most notably the Gülen movement, which was accused of orchestrating the coup (Yavuz, 2018).
In the post-coup environment, Oktar’s group came under increased scrutiny. The Turkish government, as part of a broader campaign to tighten control over religious and civil society groups, specifically targeted Oktar’s organization. By July 2018, a total of thirty-five people had come forward to file complaints against Oktar, with allegations of sexual abuse and rape by his cult. Among the complainants, fifteen reported being abused when they were between eleven and seventeen years old. In one case, a child was allegedly taken to the cult by their mother when they were just 1 eleven years-old, leading authorities to initiate legal action against the mother, whose identity remains undisclosed.
Although Oktar’s followers reportedly joined his m willingly, those who attempted to leave were allegedly coerced into staying. Various allegations suggest that women who tried to leave had their eyebrows or hair shaved and were physically assaulted. The police investigation also revealed that Oktar’s female followers, known as “kittens,” all underwent plastic surgery to meet his preferences for high cheekbones, slim waists, and full lips.
During the operations on July 11, 2018, police not only detained Oktar and 171 suspects but also confiscated six truckloads of historical artifacts, antiques, over 400 memory sticks, seventy weapons, more than 3,000 bullets, and substantial amounts of cash. Among those arrested was Oktar Babuna, a neurosurgeon and close aide to Oktar. As more arrests were made, additional victims began coming forward to file complaints.
The 2018 police operation, following two years of surveillance, led to Oktar’s arrest and the detention of over 236 of his followers. This action was a component of a larger effort to suppress independent religious movements operating outside state-controlled frameworks. Following the 2018 crackdown, Adnan Oktar faced severe legal charges, including sexual abuse, espionage, blackmail, and forming a criminal organization. The resulting trials led to lengthy prison sentences for Oktar and many of his close associates, with Oktar being sentenced to 8,658 years in prison on November 17, 2022. This verdict effectively marked the decline of his movement’s influence in Turkey (Aviv 2022). The movement’s downfall prompted significant scrutiny and criticism of the ruling party, raising questions about how the movement operated unchecked for so long. Critics argued that the case highlighted the risks posed by religious communities, cults, and esoteric organizations that gain political and economic power.
DOCTRINES/BELIEFS
The Adnan Oktar movement, centered around its charismatic leader, is known primarily for its staunch opposition to the theory of evolution and its fervent advocacy of Islamic creationism. This movement blends a controversial form of conservative Islam with a modern lifestyle, marked by an emphasis on physical beauty as a reflection of spiritual purity. The movement also espoused conspiracy theories, historically targeting Freemasons, Zionists, and “Darwinists,” though these views have been tempered in favor of more pro-Zionist ideologies in recent years.
At its core, the movement has consistently rejected Darwinism, positioning itself as a key proponent of Islamic creationism. However, its broader philosophy has shifted significantly over time. Initially, the group harbored strong anti-Semitic and anti-Atatürk sentiments, but since the 2000s, it has transformed, embracing a pro-Israeli, pro-Zionist stance and expressing admiration for Atatürk’s legacy. In recent years, the movement has increasingly focused on messianism, with some followers suggesting that Oktar could be the Mahdi, the awaited Islamic messianic figure. This shift towards messianic beliefs echoes similar trends in other religious groups, such as the followers of Fethullah Gülen, where the leader’s role often becomes intertwined with messianic expectations. In recent years, the Oktar movement began advocating for interfaith dialogue and, as previously mentioned, embracing messianism. Against this backdrop, the movement hosted and met with numerous religious leaders from various faiths in an effort to promote interfaith cooperation. Oktar himself asserted that Muslims, like Jews, should pray for the arrival of the Messiah. This philosophy became a central focus of the movement’s ideology.
RITUALS/PRACTICES
Adnan Oktar’s group, centralized around his charismatic leadership, evolved from a small, ideologically-driven movement into a significant media entity with an international reach, primarily through the Science Research Foundation (BAV) and the A9 TV channel. The organization maintained a network of loyal followers, including influential and wealthy individuals, and established international connections, particularly in the United States and Europe. However, its distance from mainstream political Islam and controversial practices eventually made it a target in the increasingly authoritarian environment of post-2016 Turkey. The group’s ultimate dismantling highlights the Turkish state’s efforts to assert control over all religious movements within its borders, especially following the 2016 coup attempt.
ORGANIZATION/LEADERSHIP
Adnan Oktar’s leadership was marked by his charismatic presence and central role in transforming his movement from a minor, ideologically-driven faction into a prominent media entity with substantial international influence. Centralized around Oktar’s dynamic personality, his leadership was instrumental in establishing the Science Research Foundation (BAV) and the A9 TV channel, which played a crucial role in disseminating his ideas and ideology. Under Oktar’s direction, the organization built a network of loyal adherents, including influential and wealthy individuals, and forged international connections, particularly in the United States and Europe. Oktar’s charisma was a key factor in attracting and retaining followers, as reflected in testimonies from those who left the movement or were freed after his arrest, citing his magnetic personality as a major reason for their initial involvement.
Despite his charm and influential presence, Oktar’s movement eventually faced scrutiny and persecution in Turkey’s increasingly authoritarian climate following the 2016 coup attempt. The group’s eventual dismantling underscored the Turkish state’s broader efforts to assert control over independent religious movements and tighten its grip on religious and civil society. Oktar’s personality, characterized by charisma, self-confidence, and flamboyance, played a crucial role in drawing followers and maintaining their loyalty. His public appearances and media presence, marked by a polished and extravagant style, projected an aura of authority and sophistication, while his assertive rhetoric and ambitious media ventures bolstered his influence.
Oktar’s distinctive appearance and mannerisms, along with his audacious media ventures and self-styled intellectual image, reinforced his public persona. However, his extravagant lifestyle, controversial views, and unorthodox practices made him a target in the post-2016 Turkish climate. Despite his significant media presence and influence, Oktar’s lack of formal training in Islamic studies or science, coupled with his reliance on contemporary media strategies, highlighted the complexity of his role. As a significant Muslim figure primarily known for his propagation of Islamic creationism, Oktar’s impact was also shaped by his ideological shifts and his relationship with Turkish politics. While his support for Erdoğan was evident, the ideological shifts and blurred distinctions between secularism, Islam, and Atatürkism fueled suspicion and mistrust. This evolving dynamic contributed to the eventual crackdown on Oktar’s movement, reflecting the broader political tensions in Turkey.
ISSUES/CHALLENGES
Adnan Oktar’s challenges and issues were multifaceted, reflecting both legal and societal controversies. Legally, Oktar faced significant troubles, culminating in his arrest and subsequent conviction on a range of charges including forming a criminal gang, fraud, and sexual abuse. The legal scrutiny was a response to serious accusations of cult-like practices, which included allegations of sexual misconduct and exploitation.
Oktar’s movement also faced criticism from various quarters, including both secular and conservative Islamic groups. The secular critics condemned the movement’s blend of religious and media practices as contrary to established norms, while conservative Islamic groups disapproved of its unorthodox approaches and perceived deviations from mainstream Islam.
The group’s lavish lifestyle, characterized by opulent displays and extravagant events, further fueled controversy. This ostentatious behavior was seen as inconsistent with Islamic principles by many critics and contributed to the movement’s negative public perception. Additionally, Oktar’s pseudoscientific claims, particularly his promotion of Islamic creationism against the theory of evolution, were met with strong resistance from the scientific community, which challenged the credibility and validity of his arguments.
The imprisonment and lengthy sentences of Adnan Oktar’s close associates suggest the possibility that the Oktar movement may have effectively ended and may not endure (Turkey’s Court of Cassation 2024). Nevertheless, it is not impossible that non-senior members, who currently maintain a low profile, could continue to meet secretly and sustain Oktar’s influence This likelihood increases if Oktar were to die in prison. Initially established as a religious movement, the Oktar movement has evolved into a more popular movement with a focus on creationism and messianism. It also reflects the dynamics between religious movements and the Turkish government, particularly the AKP, highlighting that no religious movement is entirely secure, even under more Islamist governments. Given that the movement’s recent focus has been on messianism, it is plausible that the messianic fervor among Oktar’s followers may not quickly dissipate.
IMAGES
Image #1: Adnan Oktar. Credit: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ Commons:GNU_Free_Documentation_License,_version_1.2
REFERENCES
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Publication Date:
3 September 2024
