LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA) TIMELINE
1961?: Joseph Kony was born.
1962: Uganda achieved political independence from Great Britain, with Milton Obote, an ethnic Lango, who served first as prime minister and then as president of Uganda.
1971: The Obote led government was overthrown by Idi Amin Dada.
1976: Kony dropped out of school, discontinued his position as a Catholic altar boy, and underwent training as a traditional healer (ajwaka).
1979: The Idi Amin led government was overthrown and Milton Obote reassumed power in 1980.
1985: Acholi Tito Okello Lutwa became president of Uganda but held power for only one year.
1986: Yoweri Museveni overthrew the government of Uganda headed by Alcholi General Tito Okello Lutwa and established the National Resistance Army (NRA).
1987: Alice Lakwena formed a resistance group, the Holy Spirit Movement, claiming inspiration from God, to overthrow the Museveni government.
1987: Kony joined the Holy Spirit Movement, which later became the LRA.
1988: The Holy Spirit Movement’s resistance forces were defeated.
1990: Kony renamed the resistance the Lord’s Resistance Army.
1990s: The LRA carried out a campaign of attacking villages and abducting young girls and boys. Some of these raids resulted in mass casualties and abductions.
1994: The LRA gained sanctuary and support when it received the backing of the government of Sudan, which sought to retaliate against Kampala for its support of Sudanese rebels.
1996: The LRA’s abduction of children was successful enough that the government set up protective camps to which children reported daily as “night commuters.”
2001: The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established, raising international awareness of the LRA.
2001 (April): The United Nations Human Rights Commission condemned LRA kidnappings, torture, detentions, rapes and abduction of children.
2002-2004: LRA attacks expanded into the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan until Uganda and Sudan restored diplomatic relations, which allowed the Ugandan military to pursue the LRA across national borders.
2003: The Ugandan government sought warrants for the arrest of LRA leaders through the International Criminal Court.
2005 (October 14): The International Criminal Court reported that it had issued arrest warrants against five LRA leaders.
2006-2008: Peace talks with the LRA in Juba, Sudan failed. The U.S. military began assisting in tracking and combatting the LRA. Joint military operations against the LRA began to degrade its forces, and fractures within the movement began to appear.
2012: A social media campaign against Kony featuring a video, Kony 2012, was launched that urged popular support for his apprehension.
2013 (April 3): The United States government offered a $5,000,000 reward for Kon’s capture.
2016: A former LRA commander (Dominic Ongwen), surrendered, stood trial at the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity. He was convicted in 2021.
2017 (March): The United States Africa Command declared that the LRA “militarily irrelevant” and that it was ending its anti-LRA operations.
2024: Kony remained at large with a significantly weakened military force.
2024: An LRA commander, Thomas Kwoyelo, was placed on trial in Uganda on charges of rape, murder, kidnapping, and enslavement of civilians.
FOUNDER/GROUP HISTORY
Uganda has been regionally divided through its history and has a legacy of brutal civil war involving multiple factions (Allen 2023). The southern and eastern regions of the nations were predominantly Bantu-speaking farmers. The northern region was Nilotic-speaking Acholi who were hunters, herders and farmers. The Acholi were disproportionately represented in the police and armed forces, which provided them with an advantage in the use of force. These regional divisions turned violent in 1986 when what became known as the Ugandan Bush War (1986-1994) took place. Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) prevailed over the Acholi president, Tito Okello, and seized control of Uganda. His army then went on to extract vengeance against northern groups that involved arson, looting, and murder. It was into this milieu that Joseph Kony was born.
Joseph Rao Kony was born into an ethnic Acholi farming family in northern Uganda around 1961. He was one of the youngest children. He later married, and the couple had one son. As a youth he was active in the Catholic Church as an altar boy until age fifteen. He then dropped out of school in 1976 to become a traditional healer. Kony began to gain a reputation as having been possessed by spirits and became a spiritual figure or a medium. He gained a small following and began to extend his spiritual activities outside of Odek in 1987.
Kony became involved in the rebellion against the government through the Holy Spirit Movement led by Alice Lakwena. She claimed an inspiration from God to overthrow the government. After a few early victories, the movement was vanquished by government forces in 1988. Kony joined and quickly became head of a splinter group, which later became the LRA. He proclaimed himself to be a prophet of the Acholi. It was in response to atrocities committed by Museveni’s army that Kony established the LRA. Initially, Kony shared leadership with Justine Odong Latek, with Kony focused on the spiritual dimensions of the organization and Latek the military component.
In the early 1990s, the Ugandan government began a military counter-insurgency campaign in the northern section of Uganda both to combat rebels and to undermine Acholic support for them. The LRA initially enjoyed some support from the Acholi population and gained support from Sudan in 1994, which was antagonized by Ugandan support for Sudanese rebels (Duphiney 2021). However, Kony concluded that local villagers were not offering appropriate support for the LRA and began attacking local villages. This created a greater division between local Acholi populations and the rebels.
Through the 1990s and 2000s there were constant LRA attacks against local villages, which resulted in abductions, rapes, terrorizing, looting and, not infrequently, mass casualties. For example, several hundred villagers were killed or abducted from the village of Atiak in 1995, and over 100 girls were abducted from Aboke the following year. In 1996, the national government responded by creating “protected camps” to reduce abductions and killings (Gersony 1994). During December of 2008, the LRA killed over 140 villagers and abducted 180 at a Catholic Christmas celebration in Faradje in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Rice 2008). A year later over 300 residents were killed and another 250 were abducted in the Democratic Republic (Martin 2010).
The LRA’s fortunes shifted dramatically beginning in the early 2000s. Uganda and Sudan restored fractured diplomatic relations, which allowed the Ugandan military to pursue the LRA across national borders. The LRA lost its bases and sanctuary provided by the Sudanese government. In 2005, The International Criminal Court reported that it had issued arrest warrants against five top LRA leaders. In 2008-2009, military units from Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan launched aerial attacks and raids on the LRA camps in the Dominican Republic’s Garamba region, with support from the United States. In 2012, a social media campaign was launched against Kony that featured a video, Kony 2012, which urged popular support for his apprehension.
While the military campaign was not completely successful, as there were revenge attacks, and Kony was not captured, there was process of degradation of LRA forces that gradually reduced the number of fighters to around 100 and produced both schism and defections. In 2017, the U.S. Africa Command announced the end of its anti-LRA operations. The LRA began supporting itself through criminal activity, such as ivory and arms smuggling (Oxfam 2011; Cascais 2023). In 2024, LRA commander Thomas Kwoyelo was placed on trial in Uganda, after being held in detention since 2009, on charges including rape, murder, kidnapping, and enslavement of civilians.
Throughout the period of intense conflict there were a number of attempts to negotiate a cease fire and military disengagement beginning in 1994. A period of negotiation took place between 2006 and 2008, but those talks ultimately broke down. These efforts involved several important sponsors in addition to the Ugandan government, such as the Carter Center and Pope John Paul II, but none of these initiatives was ultimately successful. It was after the failure of negotiation in 2008 that an international coalition launched Operation Lightning Thunder. While the operation did not succeed in eradicating the LRA, it did lead to high level defections, a retreat by the group into a more remote area, a splintering of the movement, and a reduction in its size. As a result, remnants of the LRA have remained active, although without its earlier impact, and Kony remains in hiding.
Across the several decades of the LRA’s existence, the impact on Uganda and surrounding nations, their villages and populations has been staggering (Faber 2017; Ocitti, Parker and Allen 2019). At one point in the conflict, a majority of the Acholi population in northern Uganda was displaced as a result of LRA and counter-insurgency actions. At least 2,000,000 people have lived in displaced person camps with extremely high mortality rates, and over 100,000 people have been killed. An estimated 25,000 children have been abducted.
DOCTRINES/BELIEFS
The LRA’s mission and the rationales for its activities have always been opaque, at least to outsiders. They have been inconsistent and non-specific through LRA history. Further, they have flowed out of Kony’s interactions with the spirits, which have been a powerful influence on followers but inaccessible to anyone else. Therefore, accounts of LRA beliefs and practices have been patchwork and subject to multiple interpretations (Titeca and Costeur 2014; ICG 2004; Gersony 1997). The LRA has occasionally attempted to push back against this criticism. For example, commander Vincent Otti offered a description of an ideal government from an LRA perspective (IRIN 2007):
Lord’s Resistance Army is just the name of the movement because we are fighting in the name of God. God is the one helping us in the bush. That’s why we created this name, Lord’s Resistance Army. And people always ask us, are we fighting for the Ten Commandments of God. That is true – because the Ten Commandments of God is the constitution that God has given to the people of the world. All people. If you go to the constitution, nobody will accept people who steal, nobody could accept to go and take somebody’s wife, nobody could accept to kill the innocent, or whatever. The Ten Commandments carries (sic) all this.
The LRA incorporates a syncretic mix of mysticism, mythic Acholi nationalism and spiritualism, and Christian fundamentalism, with a particular emphasis on following the Ten Commandments (Cakaj 2010). Kony is personally responsible for the major elements of the LRA’s doctrinal system as he is the only recipient of messages from the spirits that possess him. As a result, salvation for adherents can only be achieved through strict adherence to the rules that he has established through his communications. In addition, there is a close connection between these rules and the militarized form the LRA assumed as the rules transmitted to Kony dictate military organization and operation. Kony’s overall perspective is further shaped by a highly idealized view of Acholi history and culture (Allen 2023).
In the LRA narrative the world is divided into a “pure” movement and an “impure” external world. The enemies of the LRA include traditional elements of Acholi culture (ajwaka’s, ancestor shrines and clan elders), westernization, corruption, and witchcraft. The LRA is also opposed to the Catholic Church because it harbors witchdoctors and is believed to organize prayers against the LRA. Their opposition has gone so far as violence. There have been threats to kill an archbishop and Catholic priests; Catholic seminarians have been abducted and Catholic missions attacked (Allen and Schomerus 2006).
Kony claims to be possessed by fourteen spirits, with names like Silly Slindi and Jim Brikey. The spirits speak only to him. It is the spirits who actually direct the rebellion, with Kony as simply the messenger of spirits (Lakwena) who have formulated the rules of the organization. These rules are central to LRA functioning as it is strict adherence to these rules that protects fighters on the battlefield. This means disciple is understood to be controlled by the spirits, who are unseen monitors of conformity and deviance, and therefore life and death. The rules have changed frequently, usually in response to battlefield conditions (Titeka 2010).
Maliti (2018) identifies some of these spirits:
Juma Oris, the chairman of the spirits and was responsible for making sure “the will of God is executed spiritually; Mama Silindi was responsible for the yard and operations; Jim Brickey Who Are You is a United States citizen and the spirit in charge of intelligence and protected “the children of God” against any conspiracy; Ing Chu was the miracle performer and Hawa was a co-miracle performer; Owora was also responsible for intelligence; and Major Bianca was responsible for The Yard.
The LRA portrays the struggle in which it has been engaged as part of a larger cosmic battle between good and evil, and the movement envisions an apocalyptic future in which their forces will triumph and establish a new, divine order. In this vision, the Ugandan government is corrupt and illegitimate. Violence is understood to be a necessary tool to replace the current government with a theocracy (Abaho, Asiimwe, and Mawa 2019).
While the broad outlines of the LRA doctrinal system can be described, numerous scholars have puzzled over the changes and inconsistencies in LRA doctrines and policy, as well as between doctrines and organizational actions. For example, Allen notes (2023):
There has been considerable disagreement about the authenticity of the LRA’s written manifestos. It is often claimed that they reflected views of Acholi in the diaspora or of Acholi politicians, rather than the LRA who were fighting in the bush. Also, news media, many international activists, several aid agencies, and Ugandan government officials have persistently emphasized the bizarre, violent, and apparently incomprehensible aspects of the LRA, discounting any suggestion of a coherent policy agenda. It is certainly a challenge to reconcile the statements made in the manifestos with the LRA’s brutal attacks on local people in northern Uganda, who have mostly (although not exclusively) been of Kony’s own Acholi ethnic identity.
RITUALS/PRACTICES
The spirits are central to LRA ritual. Kony and other top LRA leaders have consulted with the spirits whenever they needed guidance for their actions (Kelly, Branham, and Decker 2016). These “spirit consultations” could involve chanting and singing to invoke the spirits, ritual cutting, pasting of Moo ya (shea nut oil from the sacred shea butter tree) onto members’ bodies, and amulets (Kelly, Branham, and Decker 2016), During interactions with the spirits, participants sometime have entered trance states. New members go through a series of initiation rituals and are given strict rules on behaviors such as diet, sexual relationships, and connection to nature (Titeka 2010).
There are specific battle preparation rituals. For example, in one account (Titeka 2010):
The holy spirit reported to the chairman [Kony], who selected the soldiers who could be on ‘standby’. He picked the controllers. He ordered them to mix this type of herbs, mixed them in powder form, put them in a basin together with water and Moo ya. The controllers stand near the basin and splash to the soldier, one by one. When the soldiers are near the basin, they put their gun three times in the basin, and women four times. You put the gun up and you say ‘God you are stronger than anything in the world, therefore the power belongs to you’. We also sing songs like ‘Polo Polo’[‘Heaven should come to rescue us in our lives, and we shall never leave the way to heaven.’], because when we sing, we do not even hear gunshots!
This sense of invincibility has led the religious functionaries (controllers) to walk unprotected in front of soldiers sprinkling water to “clear the battlefield.” Soldiers are instructed not to take cover or retreat but to always move forward. There is no need for protection because “God is standing in front of you, behind you and above you, so why take cover? God is protecting you! God has put you in the world, so why should you fear? If a bullet comes, God will catch it” (Tiketa 2010).
One of practices for which the LRA became most notorious was the abduction of children. Abducted children served as porters, food preparers, and sometimes fighters. Boys typically became child soldiers and girls support workers and “wives.” The abduction of children through village raids was a readily available means of replacing losses of LRA personnel through defection and death. Child soldiers suffered particularly high casualty rates. The abduction of children in village raids became such an acute problem that by 1996 the Ugandan government created secure camps to which “night commuter” children returned every evening to reduce the probability of abduction.
One of the most incendiary charges against the LRA was the exploitation of young girls (Carlson and Mazurana 2008). While the LRA was predominantly composed of males, females played important roles within the movement. The most contested aspect of their capture and servitude was their sexual exploitation. Teenage girls were specifically targeted for abduction during LRA raids. Once in LRA hands, they were isolated and initiated, with part of that process involving being smeared with oils and earth for their protection. Following the initiation period LRA leaders selected “wives” for themselves and gifted girls to lower ranking members. Higher ranking fighters had as many as five wives. Fighters who were gifted girls used them for various purposes, including sexual relationships. Abduction and sexual exploitation were legitimated within the movement in a variety of ways: as a necessary labor force for the movement, as rescue from a corrupt society, as a source of children who would be raised within the movement, and as rewards for movement fighters. As for Kony, he reportedly has over 100 wives and dozens of children through coerced relationships (Ocitti, Parker and Allen 2019).
ORGANIZATION/LEADERSHIP
The organizational structure of the LRA is hierarchical, with Kony at the top as Commander in Chief/Chairman. Through LRA history, Kony has exercised complete leadership control as the spirits speak only to him and must be followed absolutely. Orders that he issues are assumed to come directly from the spirits (Lancaster, Lacaille, and Caka 2011). He also is believed by some followers to have the capacity to read the minds of his followers, creating a kind of invisible control. Kony has therefore been both admired and feared by his followers. There is some evidence that his authority has diminished in recent years as his visitations by the spirits have decreased.
The administrative structure below Kony consists of religious functionaries and military commanders, with operational leadership in the hands of brigade commanders who lead rank-and-file male and female fighters. Kony has his own personal security detail outside of the formal command structure (Cakaj 2010; Lancaster, Lacaille, and Cakaj 2011). Alongside this military hierarchy there is a logistical support group composed of abductees and civilians. The mobility of the LRA units makes it effective as a guerilla-style, small unit fighting force.
Internally, one means of maintaining movement cohesiveness has been the formation of quasi-families. Top commanders, who are awarded multiple (senior and junior) wives, have created households made up of “wives,” servants, children and fighters. Lower ranking leaders have fewer wives and less complex family structures. Ongoing sexual relationships offer women a small measure of control in coercive circumstances, and children create a bond with fathers as well as a deterrent to escape (Ocitti, Parker, and Allen 2019). Women are encouraged to have multiple children as one means of building the future of the movement. It is also the case that women contemplating flight face the prospect of extreme punishment or death, on the one hand, and an uncertain response to their return to their families and communities with tainted children, on the other hand.
ISSUES/CHALLENGES
The LRA has experienced a variety of challenges through its history and has also posed a variety of challenges to the surrounding societies: regional instability, combatant readjustment, movement survivability, and leaderships succession.
The LRA poses challenges even if violent activity ends. The conflict has spilled over into neighboring countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Sudan, and Central African Republic, which has created regional instability (Omona, 2019). That regional instability and violence, as well as extreme poverty, continued even after LRA was contained (Walsh 2024). Further, former combatants have had to be reassimilated in some fashion. The futures of women and children abducted by the LRA as well as children born into the LRA have been particularly problematic (Omana 2015; Kelly, 2015). Women who were abducted face the problem of having children with at least biological connections to LRA fighters and may be stigmatized by their families and communities. There is some evidence that senior wives who have left the LRA attempted to return to their families but moved on relatively quickly as they faced rejection by families and communities, sometimes forming a version of expatriate communities (Ocitti, Parker, and Allen 2019).
There is mounting evidence that the viability and survivability of the LRA is very much at issue (Cascais 2012). The LRA has been remarkably resilient over a several decade period, even as a coalition of national and international entities has been in pursuit. As Day (2017) has observed:
the LRA survives as a collection of semi-autonomous units in sparsely populated peripheries that put up no resistance. Most LRA members rely on a combination of low-level predation and “transactional” trade in cash and kind just to acquire basic supplies. At times the group has been a small-time player in the sub-region’s illicit ivory and gold markets.
Finally, as for all new movements, succession will be an impending issue for the LRA. As of 2024, Kony had not been captured or killed and has maintained a residual force of around 100 fighters, along with a captive support group. Imprisonment or death could well transform succession into a pressing issue. In addition, now in his sixties, Kony is moving toward a time when appointing a successor will inevitably emerge. He has reportedly selected two sons as possible successors, but it remains unclear whether either will be a viable candidate and whether the movement will coalesce around either. It is also a possibility that, whatever the outcome of the succession process, the movement will face schism, which will reduce overall LRA strength and survivability. Given all of the uncertainties involved, the future of the LRA remains opaque.
REFERENCES
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Allen, Tim. 2023. “Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army.” London School of Economics and Political Science. Accessed from https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.013.1248 on 24 July 2024.
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Publication Date:
22 August 2024
