

Anatomy of a Government Massacre: Abuses of Hostage-Barricade Protocols during the Waco Standoff

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A systematic evaluation of the FBI's crisis negotiations with the Branch Davidians during a 51-day standoff in 1993 is conducted. The analysis uncovers extensive violations of basic hostage-barricade standards and protocols. The violations appear shortly after negotiations began indicating a premature disregard for the publicly declared goal of a peaceful resolution. Failed negotiations subsequently were cited by FBI officials as a rationale for organizing a violent and dangerous CS gas assault on the barricaded group, resulting in the destruction of the religious community and the deaths of 74 people. The violations do not appear to be random, incidental, or the result of disorganization, as officials claim. The data indicate that the FBI's on-scene commanders and tactical component of the Hostage-Rescue Team (HRT) contributed largely to the failed negotiations through methods of increased tactical pressure and psychological warfare providing justification for the high-risk assault. The thesis is advanced that the HRT command may have pursued furtively what some insiders call a 'Western' view of hostage-barricade incidents – i.e., that negotiations should be used as a means of manipulating people into positions where a tactical solution can be executed. In this context, the standoff is analyzed as a government massacre. Possible motives for this state violence are linked to the sect's defiant posture, aspects of police culture, effective demonization of the sect, and the disturbing trend of 'militarization' within law enforcement.

Introduction

'... the FBI hostage-negotiation team is ... simply the best in the business'

– Jack Killorin, ATF official at Waco, 2 March 1993

'Waco did not happen because there were no standards to guide authorities ...Waco happened because well-known and well-established arrest, hostage and barricade protocols were ignored'.

– James J. Fyfe, Senior Policy Research Fellow, Temple University, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 31 Oct. 1995

A compelling case can be made that the negotiations undertaken by the FBI's elite Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) during a 51-day standoff with the Branch Davidians outside Waco, Texas in 1993 were replete with hostile gestures, threatening contradictions, mixed messages and perplexing, inexcusable violations of fundamental hostage-barricade guidelines that undermined a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Other observers have come to the same conclusion. Moorman states, 'Regardless of the federal government agent's claims, they were not negotiating. Instead, they were deliberately pushing Koresh into a corner'.¹ In the words of the Justice Department's own report, many of the 'FBI's in-house experts felt that the FBI on-scene commanders used tactical methods that undermined the negotiations, and the credibility of the FBI negotiators'.² There is convincing evidence that the negotiations were unsuccessful and ineffective precisely because of incompatible actions taken by the federal enforcement agents. The evidence suggests that high-ranking officials within the FBI abandoned conciliatory negotiations early in the standoff and moved to an adversarial strategy of psychological warfare and tactical pressure which foiled any chance of a peaceable surrender, and provided justification for a violent assault. To support this argument, I want to systematically evaluate the crisis negotiation efforts by the FBI at Waco in order to determine the credibility of their performance, using basic guidelines established in this field of study.³

History of Crisis Negotiations

The FBI established its hostage negotiation training program at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia in 1973. It was designed to train police officers from around the world in hostage negotiation following several key incidents, particularly the 1972 Munich Olympics tragedy in which ten Arabs, eleven Israelis and one police officer died. The Special Operations and Research Section of the academy has focused on coordinating efforts by behavioral science experts and law enforcement personnel, so that both could work together in hostage-barricade negotiations. Crisis negotiations training combines the principles and applications of criminal justice, sociology, psychology, communications and other disciplines into a single conceptual framework.⁴ The training of negotiation principles and strategies by the FBI has served to legitimize the field as a specialized endeavor in criminal justice. Since 1976, the International Association of Chiefs of Police has conducted their Hostage Rescue Seminar, modeled after the FBI curriculum, disseminating hostage-barricade guidelines in law enforcement agencies throughout the country. It is estimated that about 70 per cent of trained police negotiators have been schooled directly or indirectly by FBI curriculum.⁵

The New York City police department was instrumental in developing guidelines for hostage-barricade negotiations, based on the work of Harvey Schlossberg, a detective in the department and a trained Ph.D. in psychology.⁶ Perhaps no one has been more influential in the identification and development of crisis intervention through negotiation than Schlossberg. His work has shaped the field extensively, and serves as a primary source for federal and state law enforcement training. In the early 1970s, Schlossberg found that there was a void in the research literature on negotiation techniques within police work; and he worked to develop principles for the resolution of critical incidents without the loss of life.⁷ Schlossberg emphasized managing hostage episodes as though they were a crisis for the hostage-taker. He noted that conventional confrontation strategies (assault, sniperfire, use of chemical agents) generated a high probability of violence. As an alternative, he suggested a safer approach using the vehicle of negotiation centered on research in psychology. Schlossberg's approach is marked by three key features.

1. *Containment and Negotiation.* Once the incident is contained, the hostage-taker can be reasoned with and the situation should be viewed empathetically from the perspective of a crisis for the hostage-taker.

2. *Understand the Hostage-Taker's Motivation and Personality.* Schlossberg criticized the simplistic method of labeling a hostage-taker as 'crazy'. He made the keen observation that viewing the person as a 'psycho' contributes little to solving the crisis, and can lead to a gross misunderstanding of the problem. Instead, he stressed that all actions are understandable, and that responses should be directed toward goal-achievement and problem-solving. In order to ascertain the logic of his actions, one has to understand the hostage-taker's personal history, which should provide clues to his motivation and personality.

3. *Slow the Incident Down.* Hostage incidents are infused with passion, frustration, aggression and episodic anger. The best approach is to defuse the anxiety and heated emotions by using time to your advantage. Time allows for a calmer, more rational response to surface on behalf of the hostage-taker. It also allows more time for the negotiator to work, listening to the individual and redirecting his frustration.

Schlossberg developed the principle of 'zero acceptable losses' as the guiding principle of negotiations. This continues to be a primary goal of hostage-barricade negotiations training today. McMains and Mullins, in

their seminal work, *Crisis Negotiations*, put the matter succinctly: 'The loss of a human life is the ultimate failure for negotiators'.⁸ James J. Fyfe, professor of criminal justice at Temple University and a nationally recognized expert on hostage-barricade incidents, was trained as negotiator in the New York City police department under the tutelage of Frank Bolz using Schlossberg's model. Dr Fyfe testified at the 1995 Senate Judiciary hearings on Waco, and reiterated the principle of zero acceptable losses. He stated in sworn testimony, 'Our definition of success in a hostage or barricade situation *was always a bloodless resolution* and people worked as hard as possible and as long as possible to obtain that result.'

Given that zero acceptable losses is the chief goal in hostage-barricade situations, it stands to reason that any actions increasing the risk or danger to human life defies or contradicts responsible law enforcement strategy. As such, the field of crisis negotiations has developed a highly effective model over the past 25 years by which to address these types of incidents, emphasizing a peaceful or bloodless resolution. Application of the model has proved to be very successful. The FBI reports that when federal agents pursue a strict strategy of containment and conciliatory negotiations, 95 per cent of hostage incidents are resolved without loss of life.⁹ As such, the record of negotiations by the FBI's elite Hostage-Rescue Team at the Waco Branch Davidian settlement in 1993 reveals a failure of epic proportions; not simply because 74 people died in the 19 April conflagration, but because the record suggests that the HRT repeatedly violated fundamental principles of hostage and barricade protocol for the purpose of launching a dangerous, high-risk assault.

Government's Definition of the Standoff

The government defined the Branch Davidian standoff as a 'complex hostage-barricade incident'. As evident in the Justice report, there appeared to be some confusion among federal agents as to whether the Waco standoff constituted an actual hostage situation. While the subjects were indeed barricaded, there were conflicting stories about whether some inside Mount Carmel were 'hostages' (i.e., persons held for fulfillment of demands). This confusion seemed to contribute to the misunderstanding and miscommunication between on-scene commanders and negotiators, and between federal spokespersons and the media. For example, one agent stated to the press, 'I think everybody involved would have to say we're charting new ground. This is not one where you can say, "Gee, you're not going by the book"'.¹⁰ The Justice report states that the FBI believed that the children 'were being held against their will', and also suspected that 'some of the adults' might have been hostages in the conventional sense.¹¹

Leaving this technical distinction aside, the training of crisis negotiators envelopes both types of critical incidents – hostage and barricade – and should not serve as a rationale for departure from their training. The crisis negotiations guidelines should have held in this case. The Justice report makes numerous references to using negotiations as the key to securing a peaceful surrender, noting previous successes such as the standoff between the government and the militant Christian Identity group, the Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord (CSA) in Mountain Home, Arkansas.¹³ Though it is doubtful that any of the Davidians were hostages, the point is probably moot; the HRT should have implemented a strategy consistent with crisis negotiation guidelines, particularly considering the presence of young children and infants in the Mount Carmel residence.

Sixteen Violations of Fundamental Crisis Negotiation Guidelines

By all accounts, the record of the FBI's elite Hostage Rescue Team at Waco is a striking chronicle of reckless disregard for basic principles of crisis negotiations. Since the FBI developed many of these principles and practices, conducted training seminars and 'schools', and created an elaborate curriculum for its trainees, it is inconceivable that so many rudimentary violations could have occurred. To support this argument, I offer a systematic analysis of the FBI negotiation log at Waco using the recently published volume, *Crisis Negotiations*, written and compiled by two veteran hostage negotiators, Michael McMains and Wayman Mullins.¹⁴ The authoritative guide is lauded by retired Supervisory Special Agent Frederick J. Lanceley of the FBI Hostage Negotiation Unit in the book's preface as follows:

This book is singular in that it is the first of its kind to document where we as negotiators have been and where we are in this stage of our field's development ... Pulled together is everything we have learned about negotiation and that effort by itself may establish this publication as a milestone in the evolution of our craft. This volume will establish itself as a national resource on negotiation.¹⁵

The authors of the book draw heavily on FBI materials, curricula, seminars and training, as well as personal experience as hostage negotiators. *Crisis Negotiations* is the first comprehensive compendium of its kind in this specialized field of criminal justice.

On the basis of well-established guidelines regarding hostage-barricade incidents set forth in the *Crisis Negotiations* manual, I have identified 16 violations by the FBI's HRT in the Branch Davidian standoff. The following enumeration of negotiation guidelines and corresponding violations is made and each point evaluated on its own merits.¹⁶

1. Save Lives

The most basic and essential goal of hostage negotiation 'is the saving of lives'.¹⁷ Crisis negotiations were developed by law enforcement to reduce the risk of injury or death, encourage a peaceful settlement of a conflict, and secure the safety of everyone involved – hostages, police officers, innocent bystanders, and the criminals themselves. This stated objective is entirely consistent with the public safety responsibility of the police, as delineated by the American Bar Association,¹⁸ and with the publicly declared intentions of FBI officials during the first days of the Waco debacle. Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Jeffrey Jamar told reporters in Waco, 'Were not contemplating assaulting the compound at all ...'.¹⁹ ATF Associate Director Dan Hartnett also told reporters in Waco: 'We're prepared to do whatever it takes to settle this matter without further bloodshed'.²⁰ ATF Director Stephen Higgins told a House Appropriations subcommittee, 'You have my promise that we will do our best to resolve the situation peacefully'.²¹

Violation. On 19 April, the HRT launched an assault on the barricaded sect members, firing cannisters of dangerous CS gas into the building and demolishing the structure with tanks. The assault lasted six hours before a fire broke out killing 74 people. The logic of the assault, especially given the presence of 21 children inside, is indefensible. The report by the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight later concluded that the release of 'CS riot control agent is capable of causing immediate, acute, and severe physical distress to exposed individuals, especially young children ... and (when) used in enclosed spaces, such as the bunker, significantly increases the possibility that lethal levels will be reached'.²² Dr Alan Stone, in his review of the CS gas insertion plan, cited medical case reports indicating that prolonged exposure in closed quarters 'causes chemical pneumonia and lethal pulmonary edema'.²³ Stone accused the FBI of supplying information to the Attorney General which sought 'to minimize the potential harmful consequences for infants and children'.²⁴ If the chief objective is always to save lives, what was the intent of an assault where there were no real hostages, no immediate threat or danger to the men, women and children inside Mount Carmel, and the prospect of a peaceful resolution still pending?

2. Exercise Patience

'Negotiations take time. Without sufficient time a relationship cannot be built between the negotiator and the hostage-taker, intelligence cannot be gathered, emotions cannot be defused, and problems cannot be solved. If either side is unable or unwilling to allow the time, successful negotiation is

impossible.’²⁵ ‘Time is one of the negotiator’s most valuable tools. ... Time decreases stress levels, increases rationality, allows for rapport and trust to develop, clarifies communications, fatigues the hostage taker, increases the probability of hostages being released unharmed, and increases the probability that neither police nor the hostage taker will be harmed.’²⁶ Time also ‘decreases emotions’²⁷ and ‘reduces the hostage-taker’s expectations’.²⁸ ‘Along with solid communication skills, time is one of the negotiator’s strongest allies’.²⁹

Violation. At Mount Carmel, the FBI grew impatient, provoked the Davidians by using psychological warfare, ridiculed Koresh, destroyed Davidian property, implemented a plan to ‘tighten the noose’, and then launched a high-risk assault. The rush to force the issue through an assault was initially justified because Attorney General Janet Reno claimed that ‘babies were being beaten’.³⁰ But FBI Director William Sessions promptly denied these allegations saying the FBI had no such evidence. In effect, there was no convincing reason the HRT could not have been more patient and waited the Davidians out. The House Committee report concluded that the assault was ‘premature’ and stated, ‘The Attorney General knew or should have known that there was little risk to the FBI agents, society as a whole, or to the Davidians from continuing this standoff and that the possibility of a peaceful resolution continued to exist’.³¹ The peaceful resolution of the Montana Freeman incident in 1996, which covered a period of 80 days, attests to the effectiveness of crisis negotiations when standard protocol is observed.³²

3. Negotiators Should Build Trust with the Hostage-Taker

The development of trust between the negotiator and hostage-taker is essential for any successful resolution of the crisis to occur. If trust can be forged, ‘(t)he hostage-taker will perceive the negotiator as someone who really cares about him and wants to help him through a difficult situation’.³³ Trust permits compassion to develop wherein the norm of mutual reciprocation becomes operative. The barricaded person is more likely to feel obligated to reciprocate gestures of good faith and good will. Trust promotes co-operation, compromise and conflict resolution. McMains and Mullins argue that negotiators can work with trust to create a bond similar to the Stockholm Syndrome (i.e., hostages develop positive feelings with their captors). The negotiators can carve out a role that places them in a sympathetic posture siding with the hostage-taker. If trust is allowed to develop, the hostage-taker begins to see the negotiator as friend, not an enemy.

Violation. At Waco, no such trust was ever allowed to develop. This was the crux of the complaints made to government officials by the negotiating team with regard to tactical strategies. The complaints centered on the 'punishment' of Davidians meted out, after compliance with requests by negotiators on 12 and 21 March³⁴ and which undermined any bond of trust cultivated between the two parties. In one interview with a surviving Branch Davidian, Rita Riddle, she said that the actions of the FBI 'terrorized' those inside the compound. She was adamant in saying that the sect members did not trust the government because of the threatening and aggressive gestures made.³⁵ The Justice report also records numerous instances in which Koresh and Schneider became 'agitated' by the provocations deliberately engineered by the tactical team and complained that the agents were negotiating in 'bad faith'.³⁶ Transcripts of the negotiations reveal that Schneider complained to negotiators that federal agents were shouting obscenities, dropping their pants, 'sticking their butts out', and 'flipping the finger' at them. The unprofessional conduct surprised even Schneider: 'And you want us to send our children out to these kind of people?' he queried.³⁷

4. Negotiators Should Avoid Escalating Stress

'One task of the negotiator is to reduce stress.'³⁸ 'If the negotiators want themselves or the hostage-taker to come up with new ideas, they need to reduce stress levels as much as possible.'³⁹ '(H)igh levels of stress interfere with negotiators performance.'⁴⁰ 'Needs of food, drink, sleep, etc. are all affected by the situation. With time, these needs become predominant and are unfulfilled. The unfulfillment increases stress and anxiety.'⁴¹ 'Stress affects the hostage-taker's decision-making skills. Stress elevates emotions, speeds physiological processes and interferes with cognitive processing. The ability to make decisions is hindered or even ceases.'⁴² 'Hunger, fatigue, and other needs all combine to wear down the hostage-taker and deteriorate decision-making. This leads to more frustration, which worsens decision-making skills even more. This cycle repeats itself time and again, each time increasing stress, frustration, anxiety and anger.'⁴³ If the negotiator is effective, stress levels will dissipate and provide an atmosphere conducive to a peaceful resolution: 'With time, the negotiator can reduce stress, calm the hostage-taker, improve decision-making skills, and fulfill most need states. The hostage-taker feels better and works to resolve the incident'.⁴⁴

Violation. The HRT's response plan in Waco after 17 March was referred to as a 'stress escalation' program in the Justice log.⁴⁵ This is the most obvious and defiant breach of fundamental hostage and barricade protocol evidenced by the government. It is virtually impossible to reconcile a *stress escalation* strategy with the principle of *stress reduction*. No amount of government spin

can erase the inexplicable and inexcusable contradiction. The only rationale offered for the stress escalation plan was that it would result in 'driving a psychological wedge between Koresh and his followers',⁴⁶ in the apparent hope that group fragmentation would occur. Tragically, the strategy produced the opposite effect, bonding members together against a perceived common enemy (similar to the effect of heightened attitudes of patriotism experienced during wartime), a basic sociological axiom.⁴⁷

The stress escalation program was alternately referred to as 'psychological warfare' throughout the Justice report. Psychological warfare is a strategy developed by the CIA which involves alternating gestures of conciliation and threat in order to confuse a designated enemy.⁴⁸ Psychological warfare is designed to induce acute emotional stress and psychological irritants.⁴⁹ According to CIA documents released under the Freedom of Information Act, 'Psychological warfare employs *any* weapon to influence the mind of the enemy. The weapons are psychological only in the *effect* they produce and not because of the nature of the weapons themselves. In this light, ... subversion, sabotage, special operations, guerrilla warfare, espionage, political, cultural, economic and racial pressures are all effective. They are effective because they produce dissension, distrust, fear and hopelessness in the mind of the enemy.'⁵⁰

5. Exercise Genuineness in Communication

Negotiators must believe in the effectiveness of negotiating, not in 'conning' the barricaded individual. 'People generally know when they are being "conned" and they do not react well, especially under stress. (The best approach) ... seems to be to have negotiators who believe in the "product" – the peaceful resolution of conflict. This "genuineness" communicates itself for negotiators the same way it communicates itself in counseling.'⁵¹ 'The negotiator must be caring and must communicate concern',⁵² as well as 'avoid criticism'.⁵³ 'The negotiator should be non-aggressive and non-threatening to the hostage-taker. Loaded words, name calling, etc. should be avoided.'⁵⁴ The negotiator should not embarrass the hostage-taker, but help him 'save face'. The skilled negotiator will avoid emotional reactions, communicate empathy, and understand that face-saving is a salient concern in crisis situations.⁵⁵

Violation. Federal officials – in particular, FBI agents Bob Ricks and Jeff Jamar – ridiculed Koresh's beliefs as 'bible-babble', called him a 'self-centered liar', 'coward', 'phony messiah', 'child molester', 'con-man', 'cheap thug who interprets the Bible through the barrel of a gun', 'delusional', 'egotistical', 'fanatic', and invoked a whole litany of well-chosen epithets and pejorative slurs.⁵⁶ Abandoning any effort to

communicate in a genuine manner, the FBI launched a concerted 'disinformation' campaign (a common component in psychological warfare) against Koresh which the media adopted wholesale and transmitted uncritically to the public. It was not until months after the standoff that news reporters discovered that they had been an unwitting instrument of disinformation, an issue which created considerable consternation among professional journalists.⁵⁷

6. Meet Legitimate Interests of Both Parties

'This principle emphasizes that there are usually two sides to every issue. Negotiators have to pay as much, if not more attention, to the other side's goals and needs as they pay to their own. ...Without consideration of the other side, negotiations become nothing more than power struggles.'⁵⁸

Violation. The command personnel at Waco did not recognize the motives or concerns of the Davidians, and did not understand their way of life. Koresh's request to record his revelation of the Seven Seals, for example, was evidently sincere. The Davidian leader had produced about twenty pages of manuscript when the FBI launched its CS gas assault.⁵⁹ Because the FBI refused to view his motives as genuine, they failed to negotiate effectively. Federal officials made only feeble efforts to meet the interests of the Davidians, expressing resentment and irritation toward the 'cultists' for not surrendering, refusing to allow family members to talk to Koresh, and shunning outside experts who could explain the religious meanings of the sect's dilemma. That the negotiations deteriorated into a power struggle was hardly a surprise. Increasingly throughout the negotiations, the objective of the federal agents was to confront Koresh with a show of force. But the demonstration of increased force only exacerbated the tensions and served to polarize the two parties as negotiations began to shut down. The negotiation log suggests that Koresh and Schneider became more combative toward the end of the standoff. The FBI ironically pointed to this seeming defiance as an indicator of failed negotiations and as a rationale for more forceful actions. Studies of police attitudes and culture reveal that when confronted by a defiant individual, a disproportionate number of cases of excessive force and abuse by law enforcement occur.⁶⁰

7. Establish Reliable Communication

Reliable communication hinges on forging a common universe of discourse. Subcultural communities may have different or distinct dialects, worldviews, beliefs, and norms. Language is not simply a common set of codes for all parties, words have diverse meanings, and can draw upon narrowly defined or group-bounded conceptual schemes and realities. When

crossing over into the social world of a religious separatist group, such as the Branch Davidians, it is imperative that there be an effort to understand the indigenous meanings of the group, so that language does not become a barrier. According to McMains and Mullins, 'there must be reliable communicators. The people must speak the same language, have a similar meaning for words, and use language consistently.'⁶¹ 'The sender and the receiver both have to understand the communicator. Misunderstandings can occur for numerous reasons including *differences in religion*, culture, ethnic background....'⁶²

Violation. In stark contrast, the record of FBI officials at Waco reveal a notable contempt for the language, beliefs and worldview of the Davidians. The predominant theme of communication by federal agents to the media and the public was one of denigration.⁶³ The Davidians were clearly aware of this disingenuous communication and voiced their concerns in a videotape made during the standoff. Several sect members who appear on the tape refer to 'lies' and mischaracterizations by officials. But the public seemed willing to accept the stereotypic cult allegations. The result was a discreditation of motive. One expert for the Justice Department report had the following observation: 'In the very moments when a religious reading of reality became increasingly paramount for David Koresh and the Davidians inside their Waco, Texas compound, federal law enforcement officials outside the compound, it seems, gave increasingly less importance and less consideration to religion as a motive for Davidian words and actions. As the crisis pushed toward its climax, Koresh and the Davidians became ever more entrenched in their religious convictions. ... Ironically, then, the ATF and the FBI were consistently and increasingly evaluated in religious terms by the Branch Davidians, but the federal law enforcement agencies declined for the most part, to evaluate religion as a determining factor in actions and attitudes of the Branch Davidian community.'⁶⁴ According to another behavioral science expert, Dr Nancy Ammerman, some FBI agents found religion to be a '... foreign category. They (had) little experience with religion themselves, and they (did) not really understand how anyone could believe in a reality not readily provable by empirical means. ... People in positions of public service have perhaps come to believe that religion is not a part of the culture about which they need to be conversant.'⁶⁵ Ammerman also found that some FBI agents allowed their own religious beliefs to color their judgement: '(T)he depth of their own faith sometimes made it difficult for them to identify with someone whose faith was so different. Because Koresh practiced many things their faith forbade, they could only see his group as heretical or perhaps as a "cult". They could not see the functional similarities between their own experience and the experiences of the Branch Davidians'.⁶⁶

8. *Take into Account Personality Factors of Hostage-Taker*

'(P)ersonality will help define what the person sees as threatening, how chances of managing that threat are evaluated and how the person will react to threat. For instance, paranoid people tend to be more alert, feel more threat and react more easily than (others). Therefore, they will be more alert to threats, they will react more quickly to the things they think are threatening and they will take longer to settle down after being aroused.'⁶⁷ Since the FBI's own psychological experts, Murray Miron and Clint Van Zant, diagnosed Koresh as 'paranoid',⁶⁸ the appropriate strategy should have been to take steps to *reduce* threat and the show of force. According to the crisis negotiations manual, 'A police response that emphasizes power will generally be threatening and lead to arousal in most people. The visible presence of weapons raises normal people's anxiety level. The obvious presence of massive firepower will lead to intense anxiety.'⁶⁹

Violation. By launching vitriolic, personal attacks on Koresh and Schneider in the media, the FBI undermined negotiation efforts. An image of Davidian leaders was painted to suggest that these personalities were unstable and capable of killing children and ordering mass suicide. If HRT commanders believed this, it defies logic that they would intensify efforts of provocation. This point was made by their own advisors during the standoff and recorded in the Justice report. Pete Smerick and Mark Young advised on-scene commanders to ease the aggressive pressure at Mount Carmel in a memo dated 5 March. The report states, 'It was their belief that increasing the tactical pressure would simply increase the fear and paranoia of Koresh's followers, thereby reaffirming their desire to stay inside with Koresh'.⁷⁰ On 7 March, Smerick and Young advised the FBI commanders 'that efforts be made to shore up the trust between Koresh and the negotiators'.⁷¹ Smerick and Young explained that if the FBI could not establish some trust with Koresh, the negotiations would eventually deteriorate and increase the chances of an assault. '(They) warned that the FBI would be criticized if children were killed in such an attack, just as the Philadelphia Police were criticized after five children died in the assault on the MOVE sect in 1985.'⁷² On 8 March, Smerick and Young stated that 'while it would be natural for law enforcement to feel frustrated at the slow pace of negotiations, and to feel that Koresh was toying with the FBI, a strong law enforcement show of force would simply play into Koresh's hands and allow him to justify continuing the standoff. ... Thus Smerick and Young suggested moving back from the compound, not to show law enforcement weakness, but to sap from Koresh the source of his powerful hold over his followers – the prediction that the government was about to start a war against them.'⁷³ Their good advice was ignored.

9. Provide Assurance of Safety and Security of Person in Crisis

Reassurance of the person's safety should be made, and the negotiator must persuade him 'of the control the negotiator has of his side of the event. ... Emotional security takes longer to build and depends on the negotiator's ability to communicate understanding of the subject as well as the negotiator's ability to make good on an agreement.'⁷⁴

Violation. The lack of control that negotiators possessed at Mount Carmel was a critical flaw in the government's handling of the Waco standoff. Negotiators did not have control of their side of the bargaining and were disturbed by the tactical maneuvers of aggression when the Davidians responded positively to good-faith negotiations. It is a basic axiom in behavior modification theory that if one wants to increase the likelihood of eliciting a particular behavior, a reward is given to reinforce the desired response. This is precisely what the negotiators obtained from the Davidians when, in response to positive actions, persons were allowed to leave on 12 and 21 March. But as noted previously, rather than rewarding these responses, the FBI commanders instead 'punished' the Davidians by cutting off power and smashing their vehicles with tanks. Two and a half weeks into the standoff, the HRT 'requested a library of recordings of different sounds to be broadcast for purposes of *sleep deprivation*.'⁷⁵ Dr Robert Cancro, in his review of the matter, stated, '(F)rom a behavioral science perspective it is not clear what benefits were expected from imposing sleep deprivation on the members of the compound. If anything, this was likely to make their behavior more erratic and less predictable.'⁷⁶ None the less, the Justice report records that around this same time 'SAC Jamar decided it was time to increase the pressure.'⁷⁷ Dr Alan Stone notes that 'By March 21, the FBI was concentrating on tactical pressure alone: first by using all-out psycho-physiological warfare intended to stress and intimidate the Branch Davidians; and second, by "tightening the noose" with a circle of armored vehicles.'⁷⁸ How were these actions contributing to the assurance of safety and security for the persons in crisis?

10. Conduct Negotiations Without Challenging Hostage-Taker's Sense of Control

'A key issue during this stage (accommodation/ negotiation) is guiding the negotiators in a direction the negotiator wants to go while not challenging the hostage-takers' sense of control. When people feel a loss of control, stress is generated, judgement is impaired, and crisis occurs.'⁷⁹ 'When the hostage-taker refuses to concede or surrender, the negotiator becomes frustrated. There is a natural tendency to assert authority and rely on his or

her position of power. ...The negotiator should be careful not to abuse his or her power."⁸⁰

Violation. According to the Justice Department report, 'certain tactical operations (were) designed to tighten the perimeter around the compound to demonstrate to those inside that Koresh was not in full control ...'.⁸¹ The FBI thought it crucial to the resolution of the standoff that they show unequivocal control and a superior show of force. Stone summarized the problem as follows: 'What went wrong at Waco was not that the FBI lacked expertise in behavioral science or in the understanding of unconventional religious groups. Rather the commander on the ground and others committed to tactical-aggressive ... practices ... and tried to assert control and demonstrate to Koresh that they were in charge.'⁸² The Justice Department's log of events records numerous power plays by the HRT during negotiations, including encircling the compound with CEVs and snipers, destroying Davidian property, instructing helicopters to fly at low altitude around the building, focusing high-intensity stadium lights on the compound, and blaring constant noise, at times exceeding 105 decibels, day and night. The Justice report reveals a plan designed to directly challenge Koresh's control.

11. Negotiators Should not Set Deadlines for Incident's Resolution

'On-scene commanders are often concerned with such issues as overtime, inconvenience to the department and citizens and other peripheral issues. This may influence their judgement, causing them to desire a rapid resolution.'⁸³ 'Negotiating teams are often under pressure from on-scene commanders ... to hurry and resolve the incident for reasons of publicity (i.e., so media will not write negatively about police), finances (i.e., overtime pay), manpower needs, or citizen comfort. The negotiators should ignore these pressures, realize that hostage situations require time and be prepared to negotiate as long as necessary or as progress is being made. ... There is no real reason for the negotiator to hurry.'⁸⁴

Violation. Justice Department records indicate that 'the tactical personnel were often impatient' with the progress of negotiations,⁸⁵ devised an assault plan as early as 1 March,⁸⁶ and continued to 'tighten the noose' in order to force compliance with deadlines. On Thursday, 25 March, the HRT demanded that at least 10 to 20 people surrender by 4:00 pm. When the Davidians refused to respond, armored vehicles moved in and crushed 'a number of motorcycles and go-carts.'⁸⁷ Another deadline was issued for 12pm the following day with the warning that 'further action' would be taken if no one was released. When the noon deadline passed without activity, armored vehicles moved toward the compound and destroyed eight

of the Davidian's cars. Several deadlines were imposed by the FBI, followed by punitive measures when they were ignored by the Davidians. The final CS gas insertion plan was, of course, the ultimate imposition of a deadline.

12. Avoid Making Decisions Based on Fatigue

'Fatigue reduces ability to make decisions. As fatigue takes its toll on the hostage-taker, fatigue also influences the negotiator, tactical team and command personnel. They may make an unsound decision and want to force a resolution. ... This becomes especially crucial during ... siege situations.'⁸⁸

Violation. Attorney General Janet Reno claimed that one of the reasons she approved the FBI plan to launch an assault on the Davidians on 19 April was that 'the federal hostage team needed a break'.⁸⁹ Reno told reporters, 'Experts told us that the hostage rescue team should not and could not remain in place for any permanent period of time without being relieved'.⁹⁰ In effect, officials claimed fatigue was a factor in their decision to raid the compound, a condition that the House Committee report later refuted. According to the House Committee investigation, 'The FBI Hostage Rescue Team did not need to stand down for rest and retraining for at least 2 more weeks after April 19, and if and when it did stand down, FBI and local law enforcement SWAT teams could have been brought in to maintain the perimeter'.⁹¹

13. Resist Pressure from Tactical Team to Resolve the Conflict with an Assault

'The tactical team may want to assault or snipe the hostage-taker. ... The commander may pressure the negotiator to hurry and end the situation for a variety of reasons.'⁹² 'The negotiator's commander may interfere with or impede his or her ability to handle time demands from the hostage-taker'. But '(t)he negotiator is responsible for the safety of all parties involved in the hostage situation'.⁹³

Violation. Evidence clearly shows that pressure from the tactical team and FBI officials in charge impeded effective negotiations through tactical aggression, causing communication between the government and the Davidians to stall, and providing a rationale for the deadly assault. Dr Alan Stone made the following observation: '(T)he FBI's own experts recognized and predicted in memoranda that there was the risk that the active aggressive law enforcement mentality of the FBI – the so-called "action-imperative" – would prevail in the face of frustration and delay. They

warned that, in these circumstances, there might be tragic consequences from the FBI's "action-imperative", and they were correct."¹⁴ According to Ammerman, the negotiators and people representing the Behavioral Sciences Unit 'were outranked and outnumbered. Within the command structure, ... people from the tactical unit were simply trusted more and were more at home with the SACs in Waco. ... There was an understandable desire among many agents to make Koresh and the Davidians pay for the harm they had caused. Arguments for patience ... fell on deaf ears.'¹⁵

14. Communication between Components of the Crisis Response Team is Imperative

'Communication between the disparate elements of an operation is essential to guarantee that all the elements are working toward the same goals'.¹⁶

'Tactical and negotiation supervisors are responsible for the information flow between their respective teams. ... In addition, they are responsible for information flow between themselves.'¹⁷ 'The tactical team must have a close working relationship with the negotiation team and the command post.'¹⁸

Violation. Once again, Dr Alan Stone wrote 'tactical pressure began at the operational level over the objections of the FBI's own experts in negotiation and behavioral science, who specifically advised against it. These experts warned the FBI command about the potentially fatal consequences of such measures in dealing with an unconventional group. Their advice is documented in memoranda. None the less, tactical pressure was added. Without a clear command decision, what evolved was a carrot-and-stick, "mixed-message" strategy.'¹⁹ According to the Justice Department report, 'negotiators lamented the absence of joint strategy sessions with the on-site commander and the tactical commander'. According to these negotiators, the on-site commander (Jeff Jamar) and the tactical personnel 'were often impatient with their progress and failed to provide them with adequate information so that negotiators could coordinate their efforts with the efforts of the tactical team ... tactical personnel reported that they were often unaware of the status of the negotiations or the details of conversations between the negotiators and those inside the compound'.²⁰ 'Many SWAT team members assigned to Waco were firmly convinced that communication problems plagued the operation. Specifically, they complained about the poor flow of information from the decision-makers down to the tactical personnel.'²¹ Communication breakdown led to dissemination of false rumors, increased anxiety and tragic overreaction by federal agents.

15. CS Gas is Unreliable and Dangerous, and should only be Used under very Specific Conditions

CS should not be used when infants or children are involved, or in confined spaces.¹⁰² Children have less lung capacity to withstand caustic chemical agents. Even with adults, though chemical agents are designed to be less than lethal, they can kill, particularly when high doses are placed in enclosed areas. According to the manual, 'CS/CN and pepper gas are less useful during an assault. They require the tactical team to wear special equipment ... and they *may produce illness or death in the hostages or hostage-taker*.'¹⁰³ CS also presents possible explosion and fire hazards: 'The authors have been involved in three incidents in which CS gas was employed by a tactical team. ... In the third incident, the gas cannister landed on a sofa and burned down the entire structure.'¹⁰⁴

Violation. According to the Justice report, Dr Harry Salem advised the Attorney General that the effects of CS on infants, pregnant women and the elderly would cause 'no permanent injury'¹⁰⁵ and that the 'pyrotechnic qualities' of CS did not pose a threat.¹⁰⁶ But manufacturers of CS gas issue stern warnings against its use indoors, and extensive exposure has been cited as a cause of death by Amnesty International.¹⁰⁷ When burned, particles can emit lethal fumes. According to one standard chemical reference text, CS gas 'forms flammable vapor-air mixtures in larger volumes. May be an explosion hazard in confined space. Combustion may produce irritants and toxic gases. Combustion by-products include hydrogen chloride and phosgene'.¹⁰⁸ Phosgene is an extremely poisonous gas. Dr Alan Stone had the following comments on the FBI's use of CS gas on the Mount Carmel Center: 'It is difficult to believe that the US government would deliberately plan to expose twenty-five children, most of them infants and toddlers, to CS gas for forty-eight hours. ... Based on my own medical knowledge and review of the scientific literature, the information supplied to the Attorney General seems to minimize the potential harmful consequences for infants and children. ... The Attorney General's information ... understated the potential health consequences *in closed spaces*.'¹⁰⁹ The House Committee report stated that the insertion of CS gas into the enclosed bunker 'could have been a proximate cause of or directly resulted in some or all of the deaths attributed to asphyxiation in the autopsy reports'.¹¹⁰ In addition, the disabling effects of CS gas on barricaded persons to negotiate, think rationally, or respond effectively is essentially destroyed. A US Department of the Army manual on Civil Disturbances states that 'persons reacting to CS gas are incapable of executing organized and concerted actions'.¹¹¹

16. Assault should be Backed by Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Personnel and the Fire Department

'(G)overnment agencies that may be necessary are the fire department and medical services such as EMS. Many negotiating teams train with these units because they are usually notified when a hostage situation occurs. ... It is important to prepare for their assistance before a hostage incident occurs. Written and signed agreements should be prepared and completed by all parties. Written directives for the call-out and use of these agencies should be prepared and discussed'¹¹²

Violation. Though the FBI planned a CS gas assault that was to last 48 hours, no EMS or fire department personnel were on hand at Mount Carmel. In her 19 April press conference, Attorney General Reno said she thought the fire department had been given advanced notice of the assault. However, the fire department officials denied this.¹¹³ According to the Justice Department report, fire trucks were not called out until 12:13 pm, eight minutes after the fire broke out, and did not arrive until 12:34 pm. The FBI then held the trucks up for another seven minutes before allowing them to approach the burning building.¹¹⁴ By the time they arrived, the structure had already been decimated. Even if the Davidians had started the fire, the government agents had sophisticated listening devices in place to prepare for such an event. Investigator Dick Reavis writes: 'Bureaumen listened to the discussion of fire relayed by the bugging devices on April 18, and presumed that the talk referred to plans for arson. But on the morning of April 19, the Bureau did not surround Mount Carmel with fire trucks, as would have been appropriate'.¹¹⁵

A Contrasting Hostage-Barricade Incident: The Ohio Prison Riot

The dismal failure of the HRT at Waco can be contrasted with another hostage-barricade incident which took place during the same time in Ohio. On 11 April 1993, a riot broke out at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility in Lucasville, the state's only maximum-security prison. The uprising began when a fight escalated into a full-scale revolt by prisoners.¹¹⁶ The Ohio state police and National Guardsmen laid siege to the Lucasville prison. During the melee, one guard and seven inmates were killed. Eight prison guards were taken hostage by the inmates. The inmates subsequently composed a set of demands listing 21 conditions which called for a review of prison policies that apparently precipitated the riot. These included the elimination of forced racial integration of cells, allowing eligible prisoners to transfer to other jails, delivery of improved medical care, and abolishing routine tests for tuberculosis to which Muslim convicts objected. FBI

hostage negotiators were called in to assist state police in the resolution of the crisis. Senator Mike DeWine, a former Lieutenant Governor in Ohio, later stated in the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on Waco in October 1995, that the FBI hostage negotiators were the same personnel involved in the Branch Davidian standoff. In stark contrast, however, the hostage negotiators in Ohio successfully resolved the incident without further bloodshed, securing a signed document by the warden at Lucasville agreeing to review a specified number of policies at the facility. The siege lasted 10 days and ended peacefully as the hostages were released unharmed and the barricaded convicts surrendered to authorities in front of television cameras. During the hearings, Senator DeWine was adamant in asserting that the FBI negotiators in Ohio were instrumental in bringing the crisis to a peaceful ending and he praised the negotiators for their work. But he was clearly puzzled about the unsuccessful, bloody ending to the Branch Davidian standoff during the same time. How, he asked, is that possible?

Indeed, it seems that the Ohio prison riot presents us with the cruelist of ironies: the convicted criminals and felons in Ohio were *not* subjected to psychological warfare, 'noose-tightening' tactical pressures, or the insertion of CS gas, but the men, women and children in Waco were. The Ohio prison inmates, who had already enjoyed the exercise of their Sixth Amendment right affording due process, and has been found guilty of criminal activity by a jury of their peers, were treated better and more humanely than the separatist, religious community in Texas, none of whom had been convicted of any crime.

The explanation for the peaceful resolution of the Ohio prison incident is fairly straightforward: negotiators followed standard crisis negotiation protocol; they employed conciliatory negotiations, bargained in good faith, exercised patience, built trust between the hostage-taker and negotiator, resisted escalating stress, did not humiliate or ridicule the hostage-taker, sought to meet legitimate interests of both parties, provided assurance of safety and security of person in crisis, refused to challenge the hostage-taker's sense of control, and avoided the pressure by tactical personnel to pursue a violent confrontation. The Ohio prison incident offers a unique methodological control for comparative analysis. Although the critical incidents are not identical, the similarities outweigh the differences and suggest that the different outcomes can be attributed to the divergent strategies implemented by the hostage-rescue teams. The only question that remains, is why did federal agents subject the Davidians to markedly different and harsher treatment?

A Government Massacre?

Official explanations for the Waco disaster on 19 April ranged from scapegoating Koresh and the Davidians to miscommunication between

units of the Hostage Rescue Team. Some of the reviews by criminal justice experts have pointed to more training and additional personnel for HRTs as a solution.¹¹⁷ Remarkably, these reviews also seem to imply that the existing guidelines were inadequate. FBI spokespersons were quick to point out the fact that they were confronted by an 'unconventional' group. However, all evidence suggests that the existing hostage and barricade protocols would have produced the desired effect, namely a peaceful resolution to the crisis. No one has made this point more candidly than Dr James Fyfe, an expert on hostage negotiations. He made the following statement comparing excessive, deadly force at Waco and at Ruby Ridge during the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing in 1995.

In the same way as mistakes were made at Waco, unnecessary blood was shed at Ruby Ridge, not because there were in place no standards for such an encounter. Instead, somebody tore up existing, well-reasoned standards on the way to that place and substituted his own. ... At Ruby Ridge, as at Waco, the problem was not the absence of rules, the problem was that rules were ignored.

... I think the standards exist; the principles are there for negotiating rather than shooting out of situations. And I think that the major issue is sort of a disregard and a sense that the rules are more flexible than they really are. ... It seems to me that in both of these situations, these rules were disregarded on grounds that these were critical, unusual situations. I think the question is, How do we get people to abide by the rules that already exist?¹¹⁸

Fyfe attributes these tragedies to 'mistakes' in judgement by law enforcement personnel, who apparently believe that the standards 'are more flexible than they really are.' While this may be the case, it does not speak to the problem of the uneven application. Numerous hostage-barricade incidents involving defiant groups have been successfully settled through standard crisis negotiation procedures, such as the standoff with the militant CSA in Arkansas in 1985, The Montana Freeman in 1996, the Ohio Prison riot, and 'hundreds of similar situations across the United States and the world'.¹¹⁹ The fact that the rules were methodically discarded at Waco raises other possible explanations, which any good scientific analysis must entertain in order to exhaust possibilities. For purposes of scientific inquiry, let's explore the hypothesis that a massacre, if not directly planned, was known to be a highly possible outcome.

In terms of motive, it might be argued that the federal agents at Waco sought to avenge the deaths of fellow law enforcement officers who were killed in the initial raid. The Davidians were seen as 'cop-killers', making

them a more likely target of deadly force, as some critics have suggested. Elsewhere, Fyfe and co-author Jerome Skolnick have studied the culture of police with regard to excessive force. They compare police to 'a tribe or ethnic group ... (with) distinctive rules, customs, perceptions, and interpretations of what they see, along with consequent moral judgements'.¹²⁰ One troubling aspect of police culture is that it often involves 'unwritten guidelines',¹²¹ and 'extralegal resolution',¹²² particularly in circumstances where the suspect (rightly or wrongly) is defined as a 'cop-killer'. Contempt for legal technicalities may lead to what the authors call the 'Dirty Harry dilemma' – deadly force actions taken vigilante-style. A general suspicion of 'outsiders' (particularly minorities and the underclass) combined with a strong sense of tribal brotherhood tends to produce a dichotimization of the world. Skolnick and Fyfe note that 'police often identify themselves as a moral force, protecting innocent and productive members of the public against those who would brutalize and victimize ordinary citizens.'¹²³ Yet it may be that in a zealous quest for the good law enforcement culture perpetrates the greatest harm. 'Oddly enough', Skolnick and Fyfe state, 'it may be precisely this sense of mission, this sense of being the "thin blue line" pitted against forces of anarchy and disorder ... that account for the most shocking abuses of police power'.¹²⁴ The unifying and cohesive function of being a cadre on the 'thin blue line' augments a sense of brotherhood, confers special status, empowers its members with the exclusive use of coercive force, and may lead to actions 'above the law'.

This dynamic is exacerbated by efforts in recent years to achieve 'total integration' of civilian law enforcement and the military in the War on Crime, leading to a 'militarization of law enforcement'.¹²⁵ Without question, the Waco siege was a paramilitary operation, complete with US Army M113 armored personnel carriers, air reconnaissance missions (by aircraft such as the Hughes 500E surveillance helicopters equipped with FLIR), agents adorned in flak jackets and combat gear, snipers with M-14 and M-16 assault weapons, a command post, checkpoints and roadblocks, deployment of psychological warfare, military assistance from Joint Task Force-6 and Operation Alliance, Close Quarters Combat (CQC) training of ATF agents by Special Forces at Fort Hood, military advisors from the 22nd Regiment of the British Army's Special Air Service (SAS), Bradley fighting vehicles, M1A1 Abrahms tanks, an M88 tank retriever, flash bang grenades, aerial diversion maneuvers by Blackhawk helicopters, and finally the insertion of a chemical warfare agent. Much has been written about the destructive 'warfare mentality'¹²⁶ of police in adopting a War on Crime posture. The warfare mentality has been shown to increase the likelihood of excessive and deadly force. As the language of law enforcement becomes more warlike, society is transformed into a 'battleground', citizens become

'enemies', residences become 'bunkers' or 'compounds', dissident groups become 'terrorists', deaths of innocent men, women and children become 'casualties of war' or 'collateral damage'. Since the goal of the military in times of war is to 'destroy' the enemy, the tragic outcome of the paramilitary operation at Waco is perhaps not surprising.

Add to this disturbing trend the tendency to attract former military personnel to police work: '(V)eterans have gravitated toward the police world, where they are welcomed because of their ease with adapting to the uniform; their acceptance of the deference owed to, and the authority of, rank; and their familiarity with firearms'.¹²⁷ Following each of the nation's wars, there has been an influx of military-trained combatants absorbed into law enforcement. The practice of paramilitary tactics is less likely to be an obstacle for those whose training in the armed forces enhances their rank and position in the law enforcement community.

The sect's defiant posture may have also played a role. In a seminal work by Paul Chevigny, it was found that excessive force was most likely to occur when police perceived 'a challenge to their authority'.¹²⁸ The Davidians, who were not only guilty of shooting ATF agents in the initial raid, but defying the authority of federal agents, may have unknowingly provoked and exposed the darker side of law enforcement culture. Clearly, during the standoff, federal agents believed that Koresh and his followers had thumbed their collective noses at law enforcement officials. The sect leader's defiance in the face of an overwhelming army of federal agents elicited terse remarks from FBI spokespersons, and seems to have induced the abandonment of conciliatory negotiations in favor of all-out tactical pressure.

Finally, the moral indignation fueling the demonization of the Davidians as 'cultists' was critical; the sect members were believed to be child abusers, perverts and fanatics. According to Michael Barkun, federal agents may have seen themselves as enforcing the morals of society by making an example of the deviant group.¹²⁹ Implicitly, agents accepted disparaging cult stereotypes contained in the Bureau's 'white paper' on cults, a 12-page document parroting sinister anticult characterizations based on unbalanced and selective clinical descriptions. Though the document is devoid of contravening evidence or substantive empirical studies or references, it apparently was viewed by the FBI as a serious primer on 'cults'. On-scene commander in Waco, Jeffrey Jamar, stated in the first round of Congressional hearings on Waco in 1993 that the Bureau had in its possession the infamous 'white paper' prior to the standoff, and had found it 'very useful'.¹³⁰

We can now attempt to make sense of the tactics deployed by the HRT. The road leading to excessive lethal force was precipitated by (1) the killing of federal agents, (2) the paramilitary nature of the operation, (3) the sect's

defiant posture, and (4) the effective demonization of the Branch Davidians. Given the confluence of these conditions, it is possible that the tactical commanders on the ground developed a plan to punish the Davidians. Undergirded by a 'war mentality' that was so pervasive at Waco, the HRT strategy may have been designed to enhance *moral distance* between the federal police and the 'enemy' in order to prepare agents for a violent assault. Military psychologist Dave Grossman describes 'moral distancing' as a behavioral conditioning process used in military training as means to prepare soldiers psychologically for killing in combat situations.¹³¹ Moral distancing is divided into two components. The first component entails a 'systematic desensitization' of the enemy's humanity, while escalating a simultaneous threat posed, so that 'killing him is an act of justice'.¹³² The second component is 'an affirmation of the legality and legitimacy of one's own cause' and 'the belief in moral superiority'.¹³³

The use of psychological warfare during negotiations as a means to manipulate the barricaded sect members into a position for a tactical assault is not far-fetched. The tactical component of the HRT is hypothetically given the task of containment – securing the perimeter of a hostage-barricade incident in order to safely allow the negotiation team to achieve a peaceful surrender. The tactical component represents 'a visible threat without which the hostage taker has no reason to negotiate'.¹³⁴ They are also given the responsibility to evacuate any civilians who are at risk within the inner perimeter. The structure and division of labor within the HRT assigns the negotiation component to the primary task of resolving the incident peacefully while the tactical component provides logistical support. Yet these specialized roles and objectives may not be as clear and fixed as many believe. Comments in the testimony of James Fyfe before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1995 indicate that there are two very different approaches to hostage-barricade incidents; a 'Western' view and an 'Eastern' view.

I spoke not too long ago to a person who is a sniper for a municipal police department. ... (H)is view is that there are two approaches to hostage situations: one is the 'Western' view and the other is an 'Eastern' view. The 'Eastern' view is the one to which I subscribe; that is that a police officer should take as much time as possible to negotiate people out of situations and should define success in the absence of bloodshed. His view of the 'Western protocol' was that police officers should regard negotiations as a means of manipulating people into positions where a tactical ... resolution could be executed. I am very troubled by that. I don't find anything in written standards that conform to it. But I have seen lots of incidents where that seems to have been operative.¹³⁵

Dr Fyfe's testimony offers palpable support for the alternative explanation. It is quite plausible that the HIRT operation at Waco adopted a 'Western' protocol soon after taking control of the standoff from the ATF. This would certainly explain the seemingly inexplicable, gross violations of hostage-barricade guidelines, the use of psychological warfare, and the premature abandonment of conciliatory negotiations in deference to tactical pressure. Within the so-called 'Western' model or framework, the steps taken by the FBI fall neatly into place; the Waco operation was not so much a haphazard or illogical plan as it was an approach utilizing a *different* framework, albeit one without any (publicly) known written standards. Of course, we may assume that the unpublished standards were not accessible by all parties in the negotiations since some negotiators were clearly upset by the contradictory tactical pressures. It seems likely that some of the negotiating team were unwilling or uninformed players in the moral drama. The hypothesis can only be speculative at this point, but it deserves serious consideration and would appear to provide a better 'fit' with the data.

A search of the the pertinent literature revealed no published documents on the so-called 'Western' protocol. But corroboration of this hypothesis was obtained in a follow-up interview with James Fyfe.¹³⁶ According to Fyfe, references to the Western protocol by police officers were made on several occasions in court testimony in which he was involved and in private correspondence. However, requests by Fyfe for written evidence or documentation have been denied. He was told that these materials were 'discretionary' and unavailable to the public. In Fyfe's estimation, the source of the Western protocol appears to derive from the training of SWAT team members in the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). The inaccessibility of these documents is likely due to their questionable legality. More information is needed on the 'Western' model of hostage-barricade incidents and the fact that these materials are kept hidden from public scrutiny raises troubling concerns. If and when such information is made available to the public, we may have a much better understanding of the events at Waco.

NOTES

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1. Oliver Moorman, Jr., 'Killed by Semantics', in James R. Lewis (ed.), *From the Ashes: Making Sense of Waco* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1994) p.74.
2. *Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, Texas, February 28 to April 19, 1993* (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice 1993) p.185.
3. During preparations for the 1995 House hearings on Waco, social scientists and scholars of religion pushed for a greater role in future hostage-barricade incidents conducted by the

FBI when confronting defiant sects. The FBI conceded to Congressional pressure by creating an advisory group of experts to the Crisis Incident Response Group (CIRG) which consists of about 40 scholars. I was asked to serve on the advisory group and part of my motivation for this research was to determine the quality of existing guidelines.

4. Michael J. McMains and Wayman C. Mullins. *Crisis Negotiations: Managing Critical Incidents and Hostage Situations in Law Enforcement and Corrections* (Cincinnati: Anderson 1996) p.xv.
5. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.18.
6. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.10; see also Mitchell R. Hamner and Gary R. Weaver, 'Cultural Considerations in Hostage Negotiations', in Gary R. Weaver (ed.), *Culture, Communication and Conflict* (Needham Heights, MA: Ginn 1994) pp.499-510.
7. See Harvey Schlossberg, 'Police Response to Hostage Situations', in J.T. O'Brien and M. Marcus (eds), *Crime and Justice in America* (New York: Pergamon 1979) pp.209-20.
8. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.371.
9. *Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate: The Aftermath of Waco: Changes in Federal Law Enforcement, October 31 and November 1, 1995* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office 1997) p.18 (emphasis added).
10. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Advanced Hostage Negotiation School, San Antonio, TX, 1991.
11. 'Peaceful end to crisis vowed', *Houston Chronicle*, 4 March 1993, p.1A.
12. US Department of Justice (note 2) pp.119-20.
13. US Department of Justice (note 2) p.119.
14. McMains and Mullins (note 4): I am aware that the text is not intended for a scholarly audience, but the law enforcement community. However, I found the work to be well-grounded in social science theory and data. I also anticipate the criticism that basing the analysis on a single work is risky. Critics will argue that not all hostage-barricade incidents are alike (there is no 'cookbook', one colleague suggested), and therefore the task requires a certain amount of improvisation. However, I find this objection untenable. A nationally known expert on crisis negotiations, Dr James Fyfe, came to the same conclusion in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1995: 'Since no two law enforcement situations are exactly alike, some claim, it is neither realistic nor desirable to attempt to hold personnel accountable for abiding by them. All other life or death occupations face infinitely varying emergencies, but with rare exceptions they hold their members to clear but flexible standards. Imagine being treated in an emergency room by a cardiologist who improvised in every case because he felt that no two heart attacks were exactly alike, or allowing generals to tear up rules of engagement en route to the front because no two battles are exactly alike.' The standards for crisis negotiations do exist, he concluded, and agents should be held accountable.
15. P.vi.
16. The enumeration of violations in the order they appear are my own. McMains and Mullins do not offer a systematic ordering. In addition, these do not exhaust the total number of principles and guidelines identified by the authors. I have selectively drawn on those which were violated.
17. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.19; see also D.A. Soskis and Clinton R. Van Zandt, 'Hostage Negotiation: Law Enforcement's Most Effective Non-Lethal Weapon', *FBI Management Quarterly* 6 (1986) pp.1-8.
18. American Bar Association, *Standards Relating to Criminal Justice Vol. 1* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown 1980).
19. 'Peaceful end to crisis vowed', *Houston Chronicle*, 4 March 1993, p.1A.
20. 'Authorities right to wait it out with cult, experts say', *Houston Chronicle*, 4 March 1993, p.13A.
21. 'Tougher rules urged on explosives, guns', *Houston Chronicle*, 11 March 1993, p.18A.
22. *Investigation into the Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians*, Thirteenth Report by the Committee of Government Reform and Oversight Prepared in Conjunction with the Committee of the Judiciary, 2 Aug. 1996 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office) p.4.

23. Alan A. Stone, *Report and Recommendations Concerning the Handling of Incidents Such as the Branch Davidian Standoff in Waco, Texas*. Report to the Deputy Attorney General, 8 Nov., p.32.
24. Stone (note 23) p.30. After the release of William Gazecki's documentary film, *Waco: The Rules of Engagement*, Stone revealed his dismay at learning for the first time that the FBI deliberately launched its assault on the bunker where the children were housed: 'I was very concerned about the lethal risks to small children of prolonged exposure to CS gas. I asked many questions (of Justice officials) about the tank plan. Not until Gazecki's film, however, did I learn that the FBI intended to deposit the noxious substance directly on the bunker where they believed the children would be. Nor was I informed that tanks would push down walls to reach that location. The FBI plan in fact imposed much greater risk of loss of life than I was told or had imagined' ('Sifting Waco's Ashes', *Boston Review*, 1997, Oct./Nov.).
25. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.27.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.* p.91.
28. *Ibid.* p.93.
29. *Ibid.* p.87.
30. Immediately after the deadly CS chemical assault on Mount Carmel, the Attorney General stated, 'We had information that babies were being beaten. I specifically asked (FBI officials), "You mean babies?" "Yes (they responded), he's slapping babies around". Those are the concerns we had' (Sam Howe Verhovek, 'In Shadow of Texas Siege, Uncertainty for Innocents', *New York Times*, 8 March 1993, p.A1). It is not likely that the highest ranking law enforcement official in the US would have made such a momentous decision without being satisfied that she had reliable information and clear communication from advisors. Yet this is what she would later claim. There is convincing evidence to support the AG's original statement. The significance of the information supplied to the AG cannot be understated. Up to this point, Reno was reluctant to approve of the CS assault, though FBI officials were lobbying hard to secure the go-ahead. In a series of meetings with Justice and FBI advisors during 14-17 April, she refused to approve the CS plan. The introduction of the child abuse claim was a critical turning point. It appears that this single piece of (mis)information pushed her to approve the 19 April assault. In the aftermath, however, the cruel paradox of killing the children the government claimed to be protecting proved to be a colossal embarrassment. If Reno had stuck to her story that she was misinformed or lied to, it would have caused a major crisis for the FBI and a public relations nightmare. It is my opinion that the AG chose to cover up the misdeeds of FBI officials. In effect, she closed ranks and displayed the loyalty too often characteristic of police culture. Stone draws the same conclusion, noting that if only a fraction of the claims which appeared in William Gazecki's film were true, '... Reno helped circle the wagons and bury the truth after the fact' ('Sifting Waco's Ashes', note 24).
31. *Investigation into the Activities of Federal Law Enforcement* (note 22) p.4.
32. The Attorney General and the FBI promoted the success of the Montana Freeman standoff as an example of 'new' policy changes in hostage-barricade negotiations. But this claim was called into question by one expert. James Fyfe, in sworn testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated: 'Nobody should be fooled into believing that the new deadly force policy issued a couple of weeks ago is actually a new policy or that it will serve as a model for local police to emulate, or it will prevent future Ruby Ridges. The new policy is a restatement of the FBI's long-term rules for deadly force and mirrors in every substantive way the constitutional requirement laid out by the Supreme Court a decade ago in *Tennessee v. Garner*. Indeed, as any informed local police official knows, any policy less restrictive would be unconstitutional' ('Statement of James J. Fyfe', *Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate: The Aftermath of Waco: Changes in Federal Law Enforcement, October 31 and November 1, 1995* [Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office 1997] p.12). See also Jean E. Rosenfeld, 'The Importance of the Analysis of Religion in Avoiding Violent Outcomes: The Justus Freeman Crisis', *Novo Religio* 1/1 (1997) pp.72-95. Though Rosenfeld accepts the view that the FBI policy of

- exercising more patience and staying the course of negotiations was 'new', she attributes a successful denouement to this posture.
33. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.92. See also William A. Donohue and Anthony J. Roberto, 'Relational Development as Negotiated Order in Hostage Negotiation', *Human Communication Research* 20/2 (1993) pp.175-98.
 34. US Department of Justice (note 2) pp.139-40.
 35. Interview with Rita Riddle, 17 Dec. 1993.
 36. US Department of Justice (note 2) p.67.
 37. The recording of the exchange is found in William Gazecki's film, *Waco: The Rules of Engagement*.
 38. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.124.
 39. *Ibid.* p.125.
 40. *Ibid.*
 41. *Ibid.* p.129.
 42. *Ibid.*
 43. *Ibid.*
 44. *Ibid.*
 45. US Department of Justice (note 2) p.138.
 46. *Ibid.* pp.129, 135.
 47. Sociologist Georg Simmel wrote extensively on the unifying functions of conflict. He asserted that the presence of a common enemy in periods of conflict intensified the relations of the group. Moreover, its unity was proportional to the level of antagonism imposed by the assailant group. The greater the level of external antagonism, the more intense the internal cohesiveness of the group. The opposite was also true: '... the unity of a group is often lost if it has no longer any opponent'; George Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*, translated by Kurt H. Wolff (New York: Free Press 1955) p.97.
 48. See Paul M. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (New York: Arno Press 1972).
 49. See Linebarger (note 48); John Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate: The CIA and Mind Control* (New York: W.W. Norton 1979); Christopher Simpson, *Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960* (New York: Free Press 1995); Peter Watson, *War on the Mind* (New York: Basic Books 1978).
 50. Quoted in Simpson (note 49) p.12.
 51. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.22. See also Francis V. Burke, Jr., 'Lying During Crisis Negotiations: A Costly Means to Expedient Resolution', *Criminal Justice Ethics* (Winter/Spring 1995) pp.49-62; G. Dwayne Fuselier, Clinton R. Van Zandt, and Frederick J. Lanceley, 'Negotiating the Protracted Incident: The Oakdale and Atlanta Prison Sieges', *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* (July 1989) pp.1-7. The authors suggest 'avoiding tricks and dishonesty' (p.3), and cite the effectiveness of being 'truthful in all instances' (p.4).
 52. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.148.
 53. *Ibid.* p.149.
 54. *Ibid.* p.133.
 55. See Bert R. Brown, 'Face-Saving and Face-Restoration in Negotiation', in Daniel Druckman (ed.), *Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives* (Beverly Hills: Sage 1977) pp.275-99; Clinton R. Van Zandt and G. Dwayne Fuselier, 'Nine Days of Crisis Negotiations: The Oakdale Seige', *Corrections Today* 51 (1989) pp.16-24; A.H. Miller, *Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations* (Boulder: Westview Press 1980); Mitchell R. Hammer and Randall G. Rogan, 'Negotiation Models in Crisis Situations: The Value of a Communication-Based Approach', in Randall G. Rogan, Mitchell R. Hammer and Clinton R. Van Zandt (eds), *Dynamic Processes of Crisis Negotiation: Theory, Research and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger 1997), pp.9-23.
 56. 'FBI heaps ridicule on Koresh', *Houston Chronicle*, 17 April 1993, p.1A.
 57. Transcript 'Mount Carmel: What Should the Public Know?' from Freedom of Information Foundation Conference, Austin, TX, 10-11 Sept. 1993; James T. Richardson, 'Manufacturing Consent About Koresh', in Stuart A. Wright, *Armageddon in Waco* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1995) pp.153-76; Society of Professional Journalists, *Waco: What Went Right, What Went Wrong* (Greencastle, IN: Society of Professional Journalists 1993).

58. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.23.
59. See James D. Tabor, 'Religious Discourse and Failed Negotiations: The Dynamics of Biblical Apocalypticism in Waco', in Stuart A. Wright (ed.), *Armageddon in Waco* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1995) pp.263-81; James D. Tabor and Eugene V. Gallagher, *Why Waco?* (Berkeley: University of California 1995).
60. See Gary T. Marx, *Undercover: Police Surveillance in America* (Berkeley: University of California 1988); Jerome Skolnick and James J. Fyfe, *Above the Law: Police and the Excessive Use of Force* (New York: Free Press 1994).
61. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.27.
62. *Ibid.* p.143, emphasis added. See also Daniel Druckman and Benjamin Broome, 'Value Differences and Conflict Resolution: Familiarity or Liking?' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35/4 (1991) pp.571-93; Mitchell R. Hammer, 'Negotiating Across the Cultural Divide: Intercultural Dynamics in Crisis Incidents', in Randall G. Rogan, Mitchell R. Hammer and Clint Van Zandt (eds), *Dynamic Processes of Crisis Negotiations: Theory, Research and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger 1997) pp.105-14.
63. See Michael Barkun, 'Millenarian Groups and Law Enforcement Agencies: The Lessons of Waco', *TPV 6/1* (Spring 1994) pp.75-95; Robert D. Hicks, 'Cult Label Made Violence Inevitable at Waco', in James R. Lewis (ed.), *From the Ashes: Making Sense of Waco* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1994) pp.63-5; Dean M. Kelley, 'The Implosion of Mount Carmel and Its Aftermath', in Stuart A. Wright (ed.), *Armageddon in Waco* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1995) pp.359-78.
64. Lawrence E. Sullivan, 'Recommendations After Waco', *Recommendations of Experts for Improvement in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco* (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice 1993) p.4.
65. Nancy T. Ammerman, 'Waco, Federal Law Enforcement, and Scholars of Religion', in Stuart A. Wright (ed.), *Armageddon in Waco* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1995) p.285.
66. Ammerman (note 65) p.285.
67. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.47.
68. US Department of Justice (note 2) pp.175-7.
69. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.47.
70. US Department of Justice (note 2) p.181.
71. *Ibid.*
72. *Ibid.*
73. *Ibid.* p.182.
74. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.53.
75. US Department of Justice (note 2) p.135, emphasis added.
76. Robert Cancro, letter to Deputy Attorney General Philip B. Heymann, *Recommendations of Experts for Improvement in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco* (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice 1993) p.4.
77. US Department of Justice (note 2) p.135.
78. Stone (note 23) p.10.
79. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.57.
80. *Ibid.* p.159.
81. US Department of Justice (note 2) p.139, emphasis added.
82. Stone (note 23) pp.14-15.
83. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.83.
84. *Ibid.* p.87.
85. US Department of Justice (note 2) p.140.
86. *Ibid.* p.122.
87. *Ibid.* p.85.
88. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.94.
89. 'New AG: "The buck stops with me"', *Houston Chronicle*, 20 April 1993, p.14A.
90. 'Speculations cast a shadow over possible explanations', *USA Today*, 21 April 1993, p.4A.
91. *Investigation into the Activities of Federal Law Enforcement* (note 22) p.4.
92. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.132.

93. Ibid. p.133.
94. Stone (note 21) p.15.
95. Ammerman (note 65) pp.291-2.
96. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.227; see also Fuselier, Van Zandt and Lanceley (note 51) p.7.
97. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p 238.
98. Ibid. p.308.
99. Stone (note 23) p.9.
100. US Department of Justice (note 2) p.140.
101. Ibid. p.149.
102. Frank Bolz, who pioneered hostage negotiation techniques while with the NYPD, and later trained the FBI hostage negotiators at Quantico, told the Senate Judiciary Committee in sworn testimony that CS would never be used against children. He also testified that CS can be lethal in confined spaces. Consider the following exchange in the Hearings:
Frank Bolz: ...before we (would) use chemical agents...(we would ask ourselves), Are there any victims inside, any hostages or people inside with emphysema or some other respiratory disease? Are there any children inside with a small lung capacity? If there were any children inside, the use of tear gas would be put aside. We would not use tear gas when children were involved. ...
Senator Grassley: Mr. Bolz, you stated that the tear gas would not be used if children were involved. Why, then, did the FBI use CS gas at Waco?
Frank Bolz: I wish I knew. I think somewhere along the line...a consultant to the FBI, a medical consultant, said, (a) the masks that they had, that the Branch Davidians had, would only be effective for about 2 hours and after that they would be no longer effective; and (b) that the gas would not harm the children. Well we know that chemical agents are supposed to be less than lethal. We also know that chemical agents can kill. If people ingest too much chemical agent physically than their body medically can withstand, if they coat the alveoli sacs inside of the lungs and inhibit the exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide into the blood, people get what is known as chemical pneumonia. Moisture forms in the lungs and they die. On chemical agents, there is also what is known as the mean lethal dose. In a specific cubic area, if you put in more chemical agent above this dosage for that area, you could kill those people (*Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate...* (note 9) pp.118, 134-5).
103. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.313, emphasis added.
104. Ibid.
105. US Department of Justice (note 2) p.266.
106. Ibid. p.267.
107. In a 1 June 1988 report, Amnesty International claimed that CS and CN gas contributed to more than 40 deaths of Palestinians in an attack by Israeli forces of persons in enclosed spaces. See Carol Moore, *The Davidian Massacre* (Legacy Communications and Gun Owners of America 1995) p.294.
108. Quoted in Dick J. Reavis, *The Ashes of Waco* (New York: Simon & Schuster 1995) p.268.
109. Stone (note 23) pp.30-31, emphasis added.
110. *Investigation into the Activities of Federal Law Enforcement* (note 91) p.4.
111. Quoted in Reavis (note 108) p.264.
112. McMains and Mullins (note 4) pp.325-6.
113. *New York Times*, 20 April 1993, p.A21.
114. US Department of Justice (note 2) p.303.
115. Reavis (note 108) p.273.
116. 'Deadly prison siege in Ohio ends as inmates walk out peacefully', *Houston Post*, 22 April 1993, p.A-18.
117. Robert J. Loudon, 'How Much is Enough? How Much is Too Much?', in *Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, Texas, February 28 to April 19, 1993* (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice 1993); Ronald M. McCarthy, 'Major Barricade and Hostage Incidents in the United States: An Evaluation of Special Response Capabilities of the U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation', in *Report*

- to the Deputy Attorney General... 1993; Ariel Merari, 'Report for the Department of Justice and Treasury's Review Board of Barricade Events', in *Report to Deputy Attorney General...* 1993. See also Mitchell Hammer, Clinton Van Zandt and Randall Rogan, 'Crisis/Hostage Negotiation Team Profile', *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* (March 1994) pp 8-11.
118. Fyfe (note 32) p.10.
119. 'Statement of Clinton R. Van Zandt', *Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate: The Aftermath of Waco: Changes in Federal Law Enforcement, October 31 and November 1, 1995*. S HRG 104-824 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office 1997) p.149.
120. Skolnick and Fyfe (note 60) p.90.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid. p.107.
123. Ibid. p.90.
124. Ibid. p.93.
125. See Timothy J. Dunn, *The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992* (Austin: CMAS Books 1996); 'Statement of James J. Fyfe', *Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary...* (note 9) pp.9-11; Peter B. Kraska, 'Militarizing the Drug War: A Sign of the Times', in Peter B. Kraska (ed.), *Altered States of Mind: Critical Observations on the Drug War* (New York: Garland 1993) pp.159-296; Peter B. Kraska, 'The Police and Military in the Post-Cold War Era: Streamlining the State's Use of Force Entities in the Drug War', *Police Forum 4* (1994) pp.1-8; Peter B. Kraska and Victor E. Kappeler, 'Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units', *Social Problems 44/1* (1997) pp.1-18; Skolnick and Fyfe (note 60) pp.113-33.
126. Robin Wagner-Pacifici, *Discourse and Destruction: The City of Philadelphia versus MOVE* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1994).
127. Skolnick and Fyfe (note 60) p.93.
128. Paul Chevigny, *Police Power: Police Abuses in New York City* (New York: Pantheon 1969) p.136.
129. Michael Barkun, 'Millenarian Groups and Law Enforcement Agencies' (note 63).
130. Andrew Milne, 'The Cult Awareness Network: Its Role in the Waco Tragedy', in James R. Lewis (ed.), *From the Ashes: Making Sense of Waco* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1994) pp.137- 44.
131. Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (Boston: Little, Brown 1995) p.164.
132. Grossman (note 131) p.164.
133. Ibid.
134. McMains and Mullins (note 4) p.244.
135. Ibid. p.18. emphasis added.
136. Telephone interview with James Fyfe, 11 June 1998.